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OSHA clarifies crane operator certification and whether a practical test is required for re-certification

2012-10-18T05:00:00Z

In a recently-released Letter of Interpretation dated August 31, 2012, an employer asked OSHA whether an independent testing organization's recertification of a crane operator could meet the requirements of 1926.1427 if the recertification process includes a minimum number of hours of crane experience in place of a practical exam. OSHA's answer was "yes."

OSHA requires employers to ensure that their crane operators are certified (29 CFR 1926.1427), which mandates that the operator demonstrate sufficient knowledge and skill through both written and practical tests. With respect to the independent certification programs, OSHA does not specify different requirements for recertification of operators who have already been certified, stating only that the testing organization certification program must have "testing procedures for recertification designed to ensure that the operator continues to meet the technical knowledge and skills requirements in paragraphs (j)(1) and (2)" of §1926.1427; §1926.1427(b)(1)(iv); see also §§1926.1427(c)(4) (parallel requirement for audited certification program administered by employers) and (e)(2)(iv) (parallel requirement for certification administered by government entities).

OSHA intended this provision to be a performance-based requirement that provides some flexibility to the nationally recognized accrediting agency and the testing organizations it accredits to determine the appropriate recertification testing procedures. OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposed rule that the negotiated rulemaking committee that developed the provision "believed that testing for recertification would not need to be as rigorous as for initial certification," and that the recertification language in the rule "was therefore included so that recertification procedures appropriate for those who have already been certified would be available." OSHA adopted the language without change in the final rule and without further explanation.

The Agency notes that the recertification procedures must still ensure that the operator possesses the "technical knowledge and skills requirements" in § 1926.1427(j)(1) and (2). Paragraph (j)(2) requires:

A determination through a practical test that the individual has the skills necessary for safe operation of the equipment, including the following:

  • Ability to recognize, from visual and auditory observation, the items listed in § 1926.1412(d) (shift inspection).
  • Operational and maneuvering skills.
  • Application of load chart information.
  • Application of safe shut-down and securing procedures.

While the Agency contemplated that recertification could be less rigorous than the initial certification process, at a minimum, there must be some valid assessment of the operator's performance during the time following the previous certification, such as completing the requisite number of hours without any incident that would call into question the operator's skills in the specified areas. In order to provide an effective measurement of the operator's current technical knowledge and skills, as required by § 1927.1427(j), OSHA recommends that any determinations based on demonstrated experience should factor in how recent the operating experience is and count only time spent operating a crane and not time accrued while performing other crane-related activities. Ultimately, however, when a nationally recognized accrediting agency determines that a requisite number of equipment-operation hours are sufficient for verifying an individual's operating skills, no practical exam would be needed for recertification purposes.

OSHA goes on to say that in addition to the practical exam, the recertification process must:

  • Include a written exam that meets the requirements of §1926.1427(j)(1);
  • Be for the same crane type and capacity for which the operator was previously certified;
  • Be for an operator who has not otherwise demonstrated during the previous certification period that he or she lacks the required knowledge or ability to operate the equipment safely; and
  • Satisfy all of the other applicable requirements of the cranes standard.

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Most Recent Highlights In Environmental

2026-06-26T05:00:00Z

Multi-media inspections are back: How to prepare for comprehensive EPA and state audits

Regulators have returned to routine, in-person inspections, and many are no longer limited to a single program. EPA and state agencies are again conducting multi-media inspections that review air, water, and hazardous waste compliance in one visit. For facilities, this shift raises the stakes. An issue in one program can quickly lead inspectors into others, especially when records or operations do not align.

Most inspectors now arrive with background data already reviewed. Electronic submissions, air reports, discharge monitoring reports, and hazardous waste filings are compared against what they see on site. When numbers, dates, or practices do not match, the scope of the inspection often expands.

What inspectors are really evaluating

While documents are important, inspectors focus on whether procedures match actual operations. They will often start with a walk-through of the facility, tracing how materials move through production and become emissions, discharges, or wastes.

For example:

  • Air compliance may be checked by reviewing fuel use, hours of operation, or control device logs.
  • Stormwater compliance often involves visual checks for exposed materials and condition of controls.
  • Hazardous waste inspections typically focus on labeling, container condition, and accumulation practices.

The common thread is consistency. If a plan says one thing but operators do another, it is likely to result in a finding.

Common gaps seen during multi-media inspections

Across industries, several issues appear repeatedly:

  • Records that do not match across programs (e.g., waste logs vs. manifests)
  • Missing or incomplete inspection logs for air or stormwater systems
  • Assumptions about exemptions without supporting documentation
  • Satellite accumulation areas managed informally outside environmental oversight
  • Housekeeping issues that create unintended stormwater exposure

Many of these are not complex violations. They are breakdowns in communication, training, or follow-through.

A practical way to prepare

Facilities can improve readiness by conducting an internal, cross-media review that mirrors an actual inspection. This is more effective than reviewing each program in isolation.

Start with a process-based walk-through:

  1. Identify where raw materials enter the facility
  2. Follow how they are used, stored, and handled
  3. Note where wastes, emissions, or discharges are generated
  4. Confirm how each is managed and documented

At each step, ask two questions:

  • Is this activity reflected accurately in our records and plans?
  • Would an operator explain it the same way it is written?

This approach often reveals gaps that are not obvious during a desk review.

A recent case: How one issue expands the scope

At a mid-sized manufacturing facility, inspectors began with a routine hazardous waste review. They noticed that waste logs showed periodic disposal of solvent residues, but there were no related air records for emissions tied to cleaning operations.

This led inspectors to review the facility’s air permit assumptions. They found that solvent use had increased over time, but the facility had not updated its potential-to-emit calculations. What started as a simple waste review expanded into an air applicability concern.

The facility ultimately faced findings in both programs, not because of a single major violation, but because information did not align across systems.

Strengthening compliance across programs

Preparation does not require building new systems. It requires making sure existing ones are aligned and consistently followed.

Focus on:

  • Clear ownership of compliance tasks across departments
  • Regular cross-checks between records (air, water, waste)
  • Training staff on how their daily tasks affect compliance
  • Maintaining documentation that supports assumptions, exemptions, and limits

Facilities that treat compliance as a connected system, not separate programs, are better positioned during inspections.

Key to remember: A multi-media inspection looks for consistency across air, water, and waste programs, not just isolated compliance. If your records and operations tell the same story, you are far less likely to face expanded scrutiny.

2026-06-26T05:00:00Z

Multi-media inspections are back: How to prepare for comprehensive EPA and state audits

Regulators have returned to routine, in-person inspections, and many are no longer limited to a single program. EPA and state agencies are again conducting multi-media inspections that review air, water, and hazardous waste compliance in one visit. For facilities, this shift raises the stakes. An issue in one program can quickly lead inspectors into others, especially when records or operations do not align.

Most inspectors now arrive with background data already reviewed. Electronic submissions, air reports, discharge monitoring reports, and hazardous waste filings are compared against what they see on site. When numbers, dates, or practices do not match, the scope of the inspection often expands.

What inspectors are really evaluating

While documents are important, inspectors focus on whether procedures match actual operations. They will often start with a walk-through of the facility, tracing how materials move through production and become emissions, discharges, or wastes.

For example:

  • Air compliance may be checked by reviewing fuel use, hours of operation, or control device logs.
  • Stormwater compliance often involves visual checks for exposed materials and condition of controls.
  • Hazardous waste inspections typically focus on labeling, container condition, and accumulation practices.

The common thread is consistency. If a plan says one thing but operators do another, it is likely to result in a finding.

Common gaps seen during multi-media inspections

Across industries, several issues appear repeatedly:

  • Records that do not match across programs (e.g., waste logs vs. manifests)
  • Missing or incomplete inspection logs for air or stormwater systems
  • Assumptions about exemptions without supporting documentation
  • Satellite accumulation areas managed informally outside environmental oversight
  • Housekeeping issues that create unintended stormwater exposure

Many of these are not complex violations. They are breakdowns in communication, training, or follow-through.

A practical way to prepare

Facilities can improve readiness by conducting an internal, cross-media review that mirrors an actual inspection. This is more effective than reviewing each program in isolation.

Start with a process-based walk-through:

  1. Identify where raw materials enter the facility
  2. Follow how they are used, stored, and handled
  3. Note where wastes, emissions, or discharges are generated
  4. Confirm how each is managed and documented

At each step, ask two questions:

  • Is this activity reflected accurately in our records and plans?
  • Would an operator explain it the same way it is written?

This approach often reveals gaps that are not obvious during a desk review.

A recent case: How one issue expands the scope

At a mid-sized manufacturing facility, inspectors began with a routine hazardous waste review. They noticed that waste logs showed periodic disposal of solvent residues, but there were no related air records for emissions tied to cleaning operations.

This led inspectors to review the facility’s air permit assumptions. They found that solvent use had increased over time, but the facility had not updated its potential-to-emit calculations. What started as a simple waste review expanded into an air applicability concern.

The facility ultimately faced findings in both programs, not because of a single major violation, but because information did not align across systems.

Strengthening compliance across programs

Preparation does not require building new systems. It requires making sure existing ones are aligned and consistently followed.

Focus on:

  • Clear ownership of compliance tasks across departments
  • Regular cross-checks between records (air, water, waste)
  • Training staff on how their daily tasks affect compliance
  • Maintaining documentation that supports assumptions, exemptions, and limits

Facilities that treat compliance as a connected system, not separate programs, are better positioned during inspections.

Key to remember: A multi-media inspection looks for consistency across air, water, and waste programs, not just isolated compliance. If your records and operations tell the same story, you are far less likely to face expanded scrutiny.

2026-06-26T05:00:00Z

Multi-media inspections are back: How to prepare for comprehensive EPA and state audits

Regulators have returned to routine, in-person inspections, and many are no longer limited to a single program. EPA and state agencies are again conducting multi-media inspections that review air, water, and hazardous waste compliance in one visit. For facilities, this shift raises the stakes. An issue in one program can quickly lead inspectors into others, especially when records or operations do not align.

Most inspectors now arrive with background data already reviewed. Electronic submissions, air reports, discharge monitoring reports, and hazardous waste filings are compared against what they see on site. When numbers, dates, or practices do not match, the scope of the inspection often expands.

What inspectors are really evaluating

While documents are important, inspectors focus on whether procedures match actual operations. They will often start with a walk-through of the facility, tracing how materials move through production and become emissions, discharges, or wastes.

For example:

  • Air compliance may be checked by reviewing fuel use, hours of operation, or control device logs.
  • Stormwater compliance often involves visual checks for exposed materials and condition of controls.
  • Hazardous waste inspections typically focus on labeling, container condition, and accumulation practices.

The common thread is consistency. If a plan says one thing but operators do another, it is likely to result in a finding.

Common gaps seen during multi-media inspections

Across industries, several issues appear repeatedly:

  • Records that do not match across programs (e.g., waste logs vs. manifests)
  • Missing or incomplete inspection logs for air or stormwater systems
  • Assumptions about exemptions without supporting documentation
  • Satellite accumulation areas managed informally outside environmental oversight
  • Housekeeping issues that create unintended stormwater exposure

Many of these are not complex violations. They are breakdowns in communication, training, or follow-through.

A practical way to prepare

Facilities can improve readiness by conducting an internal, cross-media review that mirrors an actual inspection. This is more effective than reviewing each program in isolation.

Start with a process-based walk-through:

  1. Identify where raw materials enter the facility
  2. Follow how they are used, stored, and handled
  3. Note where wastes, emissions, or discharges are generated
  4. Confirm how each is managed and documented

At each step, ask two questions:

  • Is this activity reflected accurately in our records and plans?
  • Would an operator explain it the same way it is written?

This approach often reveals gaps that are not obvious during a desk review.

A recent case: How one issue expands the scope

At a mid-sized manufacturing facility, inspectors began with a routine hazardous waste review. They noticed that waste logs showed periodic disposal of solvent residues, but there were no related air records for emissions tied to cleaning operations.

This led inspectors to review the facility’s air permit assumptions. They found that solvent use had increased over time, but the facility had not updated its potential-to-emit calculations. What started as a simple waste review expanded into an air applicability concern.

The facility ultimately faced findings in both programs, not because of a single major violation, but because information did not align across systems.

Strengthening compliance across programs

Preparation does not require building new systems. It requires making sure existing ones are aligned and consistently followed.

Focus on:

  • Clear ownership of compliance tasks across departments
  • Regular cross-checks between records (air, water, waste)
  • Training staff on how their daily tasks affect compliance
  • Maintaining documentation that supports assumptions, exemptions, and limits

Facilities that treat compliance as a connected system, not separate programs, are better positioned during inspections.

Key to remember: A multi-media inspection looks for consistency across air, water, and waste programs, not just isolated compliance. If your records and operations tell the same story, you are far less likely to face expanded scrutiny.

2026-06-25T05:00:00Z

Hazardous waste episodic events: What to do when a bad month happens

Every generator has that month. A tank clean-out gets scheduled; a forklift punctures a tote, and suddenly you've generated way more hazardous waste than you normally would. If you're a Very Small Quantity Generator (VSQG) or Small Quantity Generator (SQG), that one bad month could technically bump you into Large Quantity Generator (LQG) status, potentially subjecting the facility to LQG requirements such as contingency planning, personnel training, and biennial reporting.

The good news is that EPA built in an escape hatch. The 2016 Generator Improvements Rule added 40 CFR Part 262, Subpart L (the "episodic event" provision), which lets you keep your normal generator category for that month, if you follow the rules in 40 CFR 262.232 exactly.

Scenario 1: The planned tank clean-out

Picture a metal finishing shop that's normally an SQG, generating about 400 kg/month of spent plating solution. They finally get around to cleaning out an old process tank that's been sitting idle for three years. That clean-out produces about 1,800 kg of sludge in one shot and enough to push them into LQG numbers for the month.

Since this is something the facility planned and scheduled for, it's a planned episodic event. Here's what the employer would need to do:

  • Notify EPA (or the delegated state agency) at least 30 calendar days before the clean-out starts, using EPA Form 8700-12. Include the start/end dates, why the event is happening, estimated waste types and quantities, and a 24-hour emergency contact.
  • Double-check the facility's EPA ID number to make sure it is current.
  • Stage the waste properly with compliant containers or tanks and labeled with the episodic event start date.
  • Get it manifested and shipped off-site within 60 calendar days of the start date.
  • Hang onto every record including the notification, manifests for 3 years after the event ends.

Scenario 2: The unplanned spill

Next, picture a packaging plant. They are a VSQG generating around 80 kg/month. They have a forklift punch a hole in a 275-gallon tote of listed solvent and by the time cleanup is done, they're looking at about 900 kg of contaminated absorbent and solvent residue. Nobody planned this. It's not part of normal operations. That makes it an unplanned episodic event. Here is what they should do:

  • They have 72 hours to notify EPA or the state by phone, email, or fax. There will be no time to fill out paperwork first.
  • Follow that up by submitting EPA Form 8700-12 after the fact, documenting what happened since you couldn't give advance notice.
  • Keep the spill cleanup waste separate from your routine waste streams and label it with the episodic start date.
  • The same 60-day shipping window and 3-year recordkeeping requirement apply here too.

The things you can't skip

Whether the event is planned or unplanned, there are a handful of conditions that apply across the board and missing any one of them could cost you the episodic event relief entirely.

  • One event per year, period. Both VSQGs and SQGs get exactly one episodic event a year unless they petition the Regional Administrator under 40 CFR 262.233 for a second. That second one must be the opposite type, so if your first was planned, the next must be unplanned.
  • The clock doesn't wait. Exactly 30 days out for planned and 72 hours for unplanned are required. Miss either window or you lose the relief entirely, meaning full LQG status kicks in for that period.
  • The 60-day shipping clock starts on day one of the event, not when you send the notification, so make sure to track it immediately.
  • Manifest the waste properly. Episodic waste can ship under the standard Subpart B manifest rules, even in the same load as your regular waste.
  • Write everything down. Three years of solid records such as dates, causes of event, quantities, and where it went is what separates a clean inspection from an enforcement headache.

Keys to remember: The episodic event provision rewards generators who plan, classify the event correctly, notify on time, ship within 60 days, and document everything for three years.

2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

Virginia reinstates power plant CO2 budget program

Effective date: April 24, 2026

This applies to: Power plant owners

Description of change: The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality reinstated the Virginia CO2 Budget Trading Program Regulation, which implements the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Participation in the RGGI was stopped in 2023, but the state will resume participation on July 1, 2026, the same date on which the compliance requirements take effect.

The regulation requires fossil fuel-fired units that serve an electricity generator with a capacity of 25 megawatts or more to obtain enough allowances to cover CO2 emissions, which they can purchase in the September and December RGGI auctions.

The department also adopted amendments to the regulations, including establishing a one-time 6-month control period from July 1, 2026, to December 31, 2026.

Related state info: Clean air operating permits state comparison

See More

Most Recent Highlights In Transportation

2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

North Carolina approved revisions to wastewater discharge rules

Effective date: May 1, 2026

This applies to: Facilities with domestic wastewater discharges up to 2 million gallons per day

Description of change: The North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) adopted a rule that adds a permitting option to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program for facilities with domestic wastewater discharges of up to 2 million gallons per day.

DEQ removed the ban on new or expanded discharges of oxygen-consuming waste when the 7Q10 and 30Q2 flows are both 0 for these facilities. In other words, it allows systems to discharge domestic wastewater to zero-flow receiving streams, provided the system:

  • Meets qualifying criteria,
  • Complies with specific effluent limits, and
  • Uses low-energy methods before discharging wastewater to the receiving stream.

It’ll likely benefit areas where the cost of piping to a higher-flowing stream farther away is prohibitive.

2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

New Hampshire updates sludge management rules

Effective date: May 15, 2026

This applies to: Owners and operators of drinking water and wastewater treatment plants that generate sludge; land application sites; and facilities that treat, manage, or dispose of sludge

Description of change: The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services amended sludge management rules. Major changes include:

  • Reinstating 5-year site and facility permit renewals (instead of 10 years),
  • Adding annual reporting requirements for sludge haulers (which already apply to septage haulers), and
  • Requiring all applications to be submitted electronically.

The rule also codifies per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) sampling (implemented in 2019 for the sludge quality certificate program).

2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

New Jersey adopts permanent remediation standards for PFAS

Effective date: June 15, 2026

This applies to: Contaminated sites subject to the remediation regulations for contaminated groundwater, soil, and soil leachate

Description of change: The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) formally adopted its interim remediation standards for specific per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), including:

  • Groundwater quality standards for hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid and its ammonium salt (GenX chemicals); and
  • Soil and soil leachate remediation standards for:
    • Perfluorononanoic acid (PFNA);
    • Perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS);
    • Perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA);
    • GenX chemicals; and
    • Methanol.

The interim standards have been in place since 2022 and 2023, requiring regulated entities to conduct remediation to ensure these PFAS are cleaned up.

Additionally, the NJDEP amended the technical requirements to mandate analyses of the following chemicals in all media when contaminants are unknown or not well documented at a contaminated site:

  • PFNA,
  • PFOS,
  • PFOA,
  • GenX chemicals, and
  • 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin.
2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

Nevada adds requirements for hazardous waste recyclers

Effective date: June 8, 2026

This applies to: Hazardous waste recyclers

Description of change: The State Environmental Commission adopted regulations to add requirements for entities that recycle certain hazardous waste, including compliance with:

  • Certain federal requirements;
  • Local zoning requirements, if applicable;
  • Specific reporting and notification requirements; and
  • Other particular regulations of the commission.

The rules also:

  • Exempt owners and operators of certain facilities that recycle certain hazardous materials without storing those materials before they’re recycled from the above requirements, and
  • Add fees for written determinations (required to construct or operate a facility or mobile unit for hazardous waste recycling) and for the facilities that recycle certain hazardous materials without storing those materials before they’re recycled.
2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

California adds TPhP nail products to Priority Products list

Effective date: October 1, 2026

This applies to: Nail products containing triphenyl phosphate (TPhP) at concentrations greater than 250 parts per million (ppm)

Description of change: The California Department of Toxic Substances Control added nail products with concentrations of 250 ppm or more of TPhP to the Priority Product list, making the substance subject to the Safer Consumer Products (SCP) Regulations.

By November 30, 2026, manufacturers must submit a Priority Product Notification. By March 30, 2027, manufacturers must submit:

  • A Chemical Removal Intent/Confirmation Notification,
  • A Product Removal Intent/Confirmation Notification,
  • A Product-Chemical Replacement Intent/Confirmation Notification, or
  • A Preliminary Alternatives Analysis Report or alternate reporting options.
See More

Most Recent Highlights In Safety & Health

2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

Indiana adds permanent underground carbon dioxide storage rules

Effective date: June 10, 2026

This applies to: Entities that seek to participate in carbon sequestration projects

Description of change: The Natural Resources Commission adopted rules for permanent underground carbon dioxide storage, establishing:

  • The applicability of carbon sequestration projects, and
  • The rules for the Department of Natural Resources issuing involuntary integration orders and certificates of project completion.

The rules impact entities seeking to participate in carbon sequestration projects under IC 14-39. The regulations also affect pore space owners and surface owners.

2026-06-24T05:00:00Z

EPA aligns EPCRA rules with OSHA’s HazCom amendments

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a final rule on June 22, 2026, conforming the hazardous chemical inventory reporting regulations under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) Hazardous Communication (HazCom) standard amendments of 2012 and 2024.

Who’s covered?

The final rule applies to facilities regulated under EPCRA Sections 311 and 312. These facilities are:

  • Required by OSHA’s HazCom standard to maintain Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) for hazardous chemicals on-site at or above the reporting threshold, and
  • Required by EPA’s EPCRA Section 312 rules (40 CFR Part 370) to submit annual hazardous chemical inventory reports (commonly known as Tier II reports) for the same chemicals by March 1.

Covered facilities submit SDSs and annual inventory reports to the State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), and local fire department.

How does this impact facilities?

EPA’s final rule replaces the previous EPCRA hazard categories with OSHA’s GHS-aligned hazard classes and hazard categories (totaling 118), which are already used in SDSs. Facilities must use OSHA’s hazard classes with their categories for SDS submissions and hazardous chemical inventory reports required under EPCRA Sections 311 and 312.

Note: SDSs for substances already contain the updated hazard classes and hazard categories. SDSs for mixtures must incorporate them by November 2027.

What’s the compliance timeline?

Covered facilities must use the new hazard categories by January 1, 2028. EPA expects facilities to incorporate them into the reporting year 2027 Tier II report (due March 1, 2028).

Key to remember: EPA has aligned regulations under EPCRA Sections 311 and 312 with OSHA’s HazCom amendments for hazardous chemical reporting requirements.

2026-06-23T05:00:00Z

CSB mounts pressure on OSHA, EPA over deadly process safety gap

Sugar may seem pretty harmless. However, a deadly explosion at a Kentucky caramel coloring facility reveals how this assumption can lead to disaster. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is again urging OSHA and EPA to address a gap in their chemical safety regulations.

The board is calling for them to tackle “reactive hazards.” These are the hazards CSB says triggered the tragedy. The familiar message has been repeated since 2002, but the alarm bells grow louder and more urgent now. These warnings are not just for OSHA and EPA. They are also for chemical plants and food ingredient manufacturers. Despite not being covered in the process safety and risk management standards, reactive hazards can and have led to catastrophe.

Runaway reaction

CSB determined that the explosion happened when a 2,500-gallon reactor experienced a runaway decomposition reaction. The reaction involved an “invert sugar” ingredient used to make caramel coloring. It rapidly increased the temperature and pressure. Then it overwhelmed the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system.

The reactor ruptured violently. Two workers died when the blast damaged a control room 40 feet from the reactor. Debris from the incident traveled as far as 400 feet beyond the facility fence line. It also caused approximately $40 million in damage.

CSB found that the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system would have needed to be about four times larger. This would have allowed it to safely relieve pressure generated during the runaway reaction.

Failure to recognize the hazard

CSB’s investigation found that the company did not understand the severe reactive hazards associated with the sugar ingredient. According to the board, this failure contributed to an undersized pressure relief system. It also created confusion on the day of the incident about the increasing pressure.

The report further states that the company’s lack of knowledge stemmed from:

  • An incomplete investigation of the ingredients’ reaction potential,
  • A lack of industry guidance on the safe manufacture of caramel coloring, and
  • No warning on the safety data sheet (SDS) of reaction hazards.

SDS lacked critical information

The board found that the SDS provided by the sugar manufacturer did not warn of its reactivity hazards. CSB concluded that safety information communicated in sugar ingredient SDSs can vary significantly among suppliers. The board noted that improved hazard information in SDSs can help prevent future sugar decomposition incidents. CSB is urging industry groups and suppliers who manufacture invert sugar or corn syrup to update their SDSs for decomposition hazards.

Known regulatory gap

The report emphasizes a gap in:

That gap is a lack of coverage of facilities processing chemicals with reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.

The Kentucky caramel coloring plant was not subject to PSM and RMP. Had the facility been required to implement either regulation, the reactor designers would have had a better opportunity to be aware of the sugar ingredients’ decomposition hazards, says CSB. The board argues that this may have resulted in a safer design of the emergency pressure relief system.

Repeated recommendations

Since 2002, CSB has reiterated its recommendations for OSHA and EPA to fill the regulatory gap. Neither agency has implemented those recommendations.

Over that same period, the board investigated 15 additional incidents involving reactive chemicals not covered by PSM and RMP. Those incidents resulted in 31 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

CSB is not deterred

CSB again recommends that OSHA and EPA broaden the coverage of PSM and RMP, respectively, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards.

Both OSHA and EPA currently use chemical lists to identify the processes subject to coverage. However, CSB claims the two agencies did not adequately consider reactive chemical hazards when developing those chemical lists. As a result, many reactive chemicals are currently not covered.

Word for employers and safety professionals

The latest report highlights the need for:

  • Facilities to review not just the SDS for their chemicals but also additional sources of information about their reactive hazards.
  • Chemical plants and food manufacturers to address reactive hazards regardless of coverage under 1910.119 and Part 68. At a minimum, these facilities may already be required to meet OSHA’s General Duty Clause and EPA’s Clean Air Act General Duty Clause.

Key to remember

The latest CSB report taps OSHA and EPA to address reactivity hazards. It is also a wake-up call for facilities to understand their reactive chemical hazards. What’s more, the report calls on chemical and food ingredient manufacturers to revisit their SDSs regarding reactive hazards.

2026-06-23T05:00:00Z

CSB mounts pressure on OSHA, EPA over deadly process safety gap

Sugar may seem pretty harmless. However, a deadly explosion at a Kentucky caramel coloring facility reveals how this assumption can lead to disaster. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is again urging OSHA and EPA to address a gap in their chemical safety regulations.

The board is calling for them to tackle “reactive hazards.” These are the hazards CSB says triggered the tragedy. The familiar message has been repeated since 2002, but the alarm bells grow louder and more urgent now. These warnings are not just for OSHA and EPA. They are also for chemical plants and food ingredient manufacturers. Despite not being covered in the process safety and risk management standards, reactive hazards can and have led to catastrophe.

Runaway reaction

CSB determined that the explosion happened when a 2,500-gallon reactor experienced a runaway decomposition reaction. The reaction involved an “invert sugar” ingredient used to make caramel coloring. It rapidly increased the temperature and pressure. Then it overwhelmed the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system.

The reactor ruptured violently. Two workers died when the blast damaged a control room 40 feet from the reactor. Debris from the incident traveled as far as 400 feet beyond the facility fence line. It also caused approximately $40 million in damage.

CSB found that the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system would have needed to be about four times larger. This would have allowed it to safely relieve pressure generated during the runaway reaction.

Failure to recognize the hazard

CSB’s investigation found that the company did not understand the severe reactive hazards associated with the sugar ingredient. According to the board, this failure contributed to an undersized pressure relief system. It also created confusion on the day of the incident about the increasing pressure.

The report further states that the company’s lack of knowledge stemmed from:

  • An incomplete investigation of the ingredients’ reaction potential,
  • A lack of industry guidance on the safe manufacture of caramel coloring, and
  • No warning on the safety data sheet (SDS) of reaction hazards.

SDS lacked critical information

The board found that the SDS provided by the sugar manufacturer did not warn of its reactivity hazards. CSB concluded that safety information communicated in sugar ingredient SDSs can vary significantly among suppliers. The board noted that improved hazard information in SDSs can help prevent future sugar decomposition incidents. CSB is urging industry groups and suppliers who manufacture invert sugar or corn syrup to update their SDSs for decomposition hazards.

Known regulatory gap

The report emphasizes a gap in:

That gap is a lack of coverage of facilities processing chemicals with reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.

The Kentucky caramel coloring plant was not subject to PSM and RMP. Had the facility been required to implement either regulation, the reactor designers would have had a better opportunity to be aware of the sugar ingredients’ decomposition hazards, says CSB. The board argues that this may have resulted in a safer design of the emergency pressure relief system.

Repeated recommendations

Since 2002, CSB has reiterated its recommendations for OSHA and EPA to fill the regulatory gap. Neither agency has implemented those recommendations.

Over that same period, the board investigated 15 additional incidents involving reactive chemicals not covered by PSM and RMP. Those incidents resulted in 31 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

CSB is not deterred

CSB again recommends that OSHA and EPA broaden the coverage of PSM and RMP, respectively, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards.

Both OSHA and EPA currently use chemical lists to identify the processes subject to coverage. However, CSB claims the two agencies did not adequately consider reactive chemical hazards when developing those chemical lists. As a result, many reactive chemicals are currently not covered.

Word for employers and safety professionals

The latest report highlights the need for:

  • Facilities to review not just the SDS for their chemicals but also additional sources of information about their reactive hazards.
  • Chemical plants and food manufacturers to address reactive hazards regardless of coverage under 1910.119 and Part 68. At a minimum, these facilities may already be required to meet OSHA’s General Duty Clause and EPA’s Clean Air Act General Duty Clause.

Key to remember

The latest CSB report taps OSHA and EPA to address reactivity hazards. It is also a wake-up call for facilities to understand their reactive chemical hazards. What’s more, the report calls on chemical and food ingredient manufacturers to revisit their SDSs regarding reactive hazards.

2026-06-23T05:00:00Z

CSB mounts pressure on OSHA, EPA over deadly process safety gap

Sugar may seem pretty harmless. However, a deadly explosion at a Kentucky caramel coloring facility reveals how this assumption can lead to disaster. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is again urging OSHA and EPA to address a gap in their chemical safety regulations.

The board is calling for them to tackle “reactive hazards.” These are the hazards CSB says triggered the tragedy. The familiar message has been repeated since 2002, but the alarm bells grow louder and more urgent now. These warnings are not just for OSHA and EPA. They are also for chemical plants and food ingredient manufacturers. Despite not being covered in the process safety and risk management standards, reactive hazards can and have led to catastrophe.

Runaway reaction

CSB determined that the explosion happened when a 2,500-gallon reactor experienced a runaway decomposition reaction. The reaction involved an “invert sugar” ingredient used to make caramel coloring. It rapidly increased the temperature and pressure. Then it overwhelmed the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system.

The reactor ruptured violently. Two workers died when the blast damaged a control room 40 feet from the reactor. Debris from the incident traveled as far as 400 feet beyond the facility fence line. It also caused approximately $40 million in damage.

CSB found that the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system would have needed to be about four times larger. This would have allowed it to safely relieve pressure generated during the runaway reaction.

Failure to recognize the hazard

CSB’s investigation found that the company did not understand the severe reactive hazards associated with the sugar ingredient. According to the board, this failure contributed to an undersized pressure relief system. It also created confusion on the day of the incident about the increasing pressure.

The report further states that the company’s lack of knowledge stemmed from:

  • An incomplete investigation of the ingredients’ reaction potential,
  • A lack of industry guidance on the safe manufacture of caramel coloring, and
  • No warning on the safety data sheet (SDS) of reaction hazards.

SDS lacked critical information

The board found that the SDS provided by the sugar manufacturer did not warn of its reactivity hazards. CSB concluded that safety information communicated in sugar ingredient SDSs can vary significantly among suppliers. The board noted that improved hazard information in SDSs can help prevent future sugar decomposition incidents. CSB is urging industry groups and suppliers who manufacture invert sugar or corn syrup to update their SDSs for decomposition hazards.

Known regulatory gap

The report emphasizes a gap in:

That gap is a lack of coverage of facilities processing chemicals with reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.

The Kentucky caramel coloring plant was not subject to PSM and RMP. Had the facility been required to implement either regulation, the reactor designers would have had a better opportunity to be aware of the sugar ingredients’ decomposition hazards, says CSB. The board argues that this may have resulted in a safer design of the emergency pressure relief system.

Repeated recommendations

Since 2002, CSB has reiterated its recommendations for OSHA and EPA to fill the regulatory gap. Neither agency has implemented those recommendations.

Over that same period, the board investigated 15 additional incidents involving reactive chemicals not covered by PSM and RMP. Those incidents resulted in 31 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

CSB is not deterred

CSB again recommends that OSHA and EPA broaden the coverage of PSM and RMP, respectively, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards.

Both OSHA and EPA currently use chemical lists to identify the processes subject to coverage. However, CSB claims the two agencies did not adequately consider reactive chemical hazards when developing those chemical lists. As a result, many reactive chemicals are currently not covered.

Word for employers and safety professionals

The latest report highlights the need for:

  • Facilities to review not just the SDS for their chemicals but also additional sources of information about their reactive hazards.
  • Chemical plants and food manufacturers to address reactive hazards regardless of coverage under 1910.119 and Part 68. At a minimum, these facilities may already be required to meet OSHA’s General Duty Clause and EPA’s Clean Air Act General Duty Clause.

Key to remember

The latest CSB report taps OSHA and EPA to address reactivity hazards. It is also a wake-up call for facilities to understand their reactive chemical hazards. What’s more, the report calls on chemical and food ingredient manufacturers to revisit their SDSs regarding reactive hazards.

See More

Most Recent Highlights In Human Resources

2026-06-23T05:00:00Z

CSB mounts pressure on OSHA, EPA over deadly process safety gap

Sugar may seem pretty harmless. However, a deadly explosion at a Kentucky caramel coloring facility reveals how this assumption can lead to disaster. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is again urging OSHA and EPA to address a gap in their chemical safety regulations.

The board is calling for them to tackle “reactive hazards.” These are the hazards CSB says triggered the tragedy. The familiar message has been repeated since 2002, but the alarm bells grow louder and more urgent now. These warnings are not just for OSHA and EPA. They are also for chemical plants and food ingredient manufacturers. Despite not being covered in the process safety and risk management standards, reactive hazards can and have led to catastrophe.

Runaway reaction

CSB determined that the explosion happened when a 2,500-gallon reactor experienced a runaway decomposition reaction. The reaction involved an “invert sugar” ingredient used to make caramel coloring. It rapidly increased the temperature and pressure. Then it overwhelmed the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system.

The reactor ruptured violently. Two workers died when the blast damaged a control room 40 feet from the reactor. Debris from the incident traveled as far as 400 feet beyond the facility fence line. It also caused approximately $40 million in damage.

CSB found that the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system would have needed to be about four times larger. This would have allowed it to safely relieve pressure generated during the runaway reaction.

Failure to recognize the hazard

CSB’s investigation found that the company did not understand the severe reactive hazards associated with the sugar ingredient. According to the board, this failure contributed to an undersized pressure relief system. It also created confusion on the day of the incident about the increasing pressure.

The report further states that the company’s lack of knowledge stemmed from:

  • An incomplete investigation of the ingredients’ reaction potential,
  • A lack of industry guidance on the safe manufacture of caramel coloring, and
  • No warning on the safety data sheet (SDS) of reaction hazards.

SDS lacked critical information

The board found that the SDS provided by the sugar manufacturer did not warn of its reactivity hazards. CSB concluded that safety information communicated in sugar ingredient SDSs can vary significantly among suppliers. The board noted that improved hazard information in SDSs can help prevent future sugar decomposition incidents. CSB is urging industry groups and suppliers who manufacture invert sugar or corn syrup to update their SDSs for decomposition hazards.

Known regulatory gap

The report emphasizes a gap in:

That gap is a lack of coverage of facilities processing chemicals with reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.

The Kentucky caramel coloring plant was not subject to PSM and RMP. Had the facility been required to implement either regulation, the reactor designers would have had a better opportunity to be aware of the sugar ingredients’ decomposition hazards, says CSB. The board argues that this may have resulted in a safer design of the emergency pressure relief system.

Repeated recommendations

Since 2002, CSB has reiterated its recommendations for OSHA and EPA to fill the regulatory gap. Neither agency has implemented those recommendations.

Over that same period, the board investigated 15 additional incidents involving reactive chemicals not covered by PSM and RMP. Those incidents resulted in 31 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

CSB is not deterred

CSB again recommends that OSHA and EPA broaden the coverage of PSM and RMP, respectively, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards.

Both OSHA and EPA currently use chemical lists to identify the processes subject to coverage. However, CSB claims the two agencies did not adequately consider reactive chemical hazards when developing those chemical lists. As a result, many reactive chemicals are currently not covered.

Word for employers and safety professionals

The latest report highlights the need for:

  • Facilities to review not just the SDS for their chemicals but also additional sources of information about their reactive hazards.
  • Chemical plants and food manufacturers to address reactive hazards regardless of coverage under 1910.119 and Part 68. At a minimum, these facilities may already be required to meet OSHA’s General Duty Clause and EPA’s Clean Air Act General Duty Clause.

Key to remember

The latest CSB report taps OSHA and EPA to address reactivity hazards. It is also a wake-up call for facilities to understand their reactive chemical hazards. What’s more, the report calls on chemical and food ingredient manufacturers to revisit their SDSs regarding reactive hazards.

2026-06-23T05:00:00Z

CSB mounts pressure on OSHA, EPA over deadly process safety gap

Sugar may seem pretty harmless. However, a deadly explosion at a Kentucky caramel coloring facility reveals how this assumption can lead to disaster. The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is again urging OSHA and EPA to address a gap in their chemical safety regulations.

The board is calling for them to tackle “reactive hazards.” These are the hazards CSB says triggered the tragedy. The familiar message has been repeated since 2002, but the alarm bells grow louder and more urgent now. These warnings are not just for OSHA and EPA. They are also for chemical plants and food ingredient manufacturers. Despite not being covered in the process safety and risk management standards, reactive hazards can and have led to catastrophe.

Runaway reaction

CSB determined that the explosion happened when a 2,500-gallon reactor experienced a runaway decomposition reaction. The reaction involved an “invert sugar” ingredient used to make caramel coloring. It rapidly increased the temperature and pressure. Then it overwhelmed the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system.

The reactor ruptured violently. Two workers died when the blast damaged a control room 40 feet from the reactor. Debris from the incident traveled as far as 400 feet beyond the facility fence line. It also caused approximately $40 million in damage.

CSB found that the reactor’s emergency pressure relief system would have needed to be about four times larger. This would have allowed it to safely relieve pressure generated during the runaway reaction.

Failure to recognize the hazard

CSB’s investigation found that the company did not understand the severe reactive hazards associated with the sugar ingredient. According to the board, this failure contributed to an undersized pressure relief system. It also created confusion on the day of the incident about the increasing pressure.

The report further states that the company’s lack of knowledge stemmed from:

  • An incomplete investigation of the ingredients’ reaction potential,
  • A lack of industry guidance on the safe manufacture of caramel coloring, and
  • No warning on the safety data sheet (SDS) of reaction hazards.

SDS lacked critical information

The board found that the SDS provided by the sugar manufacturer did not warn of its reactivity hazards. CSB concluded that safety information communicated in sugar ingredient SDSs can vary significantly among suppliers. The board noted that improved hazard information in SDSs can help prevent future sugar decomposition incidents. CSB is urging industry groups and suppliers who manufacture invert sugar or corn syrup to update their SDSs for decomposition hazards.

Known regulatory gap

The report emphasizes a gap in:

That gap is a lack of coverage of facilities processing chemicals with reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.

The Kentucky caramel coloring plant was not subject to PSM and RMP. Had the facility been required to implement either regulation, the reactor designers would have had a better opportunity to be aware of the sugar ingredients’ decomposition hazards, says CSB. The board argues that this may have resulted in a safer design of the emergency pressure relief system.

Repeated recommendations

Since 2002, CSB has reiterated its recommendations for OSHA and EPA to fill the regulatory gap. Neither agency has implemented those recommendations.

Over that same period, the board investigated 15 additional incidents involving reactive chemicals not covered by PSM and RMP. Those incidents resulted in 31 fatalities and hundreds of injuries.

CSB is not deterred

CSB again recommends that OSHA and EPA broaden the coverage of PSM and RMP, respectively, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards.

Both OSHA and EPA currently use chemical lists to identify the processes subject to coverage. However, CSB claims the two agencies did not adequately consider reactive chemical hazards when developing those chemical lists. As a result, many reactive chemicals are currently not covered.

Word for employers and safety professionals

The latest report highlights the need for:

  • Facilities to review not just the SDS for their chemicals but also additional sources of information about their reactive hazards.
  • Chemical plants and food manufacturers to address reactive hazards regardless of coverage under 1910.119 and Part 68. At a minimum, these facilities may already be required to meet OSHA’s General Duty Clause and EPA’s Clean Air Act General Duty Clause.

Key to remember

The latest CSB report taps OSHA and EPA to address reactivity hazards. It is also a wake-up call for facilities to understand their reactive chemical hazards. What’s more, the report calls on chemical and food ingredient manufacturers to revisit their SDSs regarding reactive hazards.

2026-06-18T05:00:00Z

Hazardous waste determinations in practice: Lessons from aerosols, residues, and empty containers

Hazardous waste determinations remain one of the most common sources of noncompliance under RCRA. The requirement is simple on paper. Generators must determine whether a material is a hazardous waste at the point of generation. In practice, facilities often struggle with how the rules apply to everyday situations. Aerosol cans, process residues, and empty containers are frequent gray areas that lead to inconsistent decisions, inspection findings, and, in some cases, enforcement.

At the core, the regulatory expectation is clear: generators must evaluate each waste to determine if it is listed or exhibits a characteristic of hazardous waste (40 CFR 262.11). That evaluation must be made when the waste is first generated and must be documented. The challenge is not the rule itself, but how it applies to materials that fall between operational categories – products, wastes, and residuals.

Aerosols: When a common waste becomes a compliance risk

Aerosol cans are widely used across industries for maintenance, coatings, and cleaning. Facilities often assume that once a can is “empty” or depressurized, it is no longer subject to hazardous waste rules. That assumption can be risky.

If an aerosol can contains a listed solvent or exhibits ignitability (D001), it is a hazardous waste unless managed under an exclusion or alternative standard. Since 2019, many aerosol cans can be managed as universal waste (40 CFR Part 273), which simplifies handling. However, this option introduces its own requirements, including labeling, accumulation time limits, and proper puncturing practices.

A common issue arises at puncturing stations. For example, a maintenance shop installs a puncturing device and begins draining leftover propellant and product into a drum. The cans themselves may now meet the empty container standard, but the collected liquid often remains hazardous waste. In several inspections, regulators have cited facilities not for the cans, but for failing to characterize the accumulated liquid or for allowing it to evaporate without proper controls.

The lesson is straightforward: shifting management methods (e.g., puncturing or using universal waste standards) does not eliminate the obligation to evaluate all resulting waste streams.

Residues: Small quantities, big implications

Residues are another frequent source of confusion. These can include paint booth sludge, tank bottoms, or material left in process equipment. Facilities sometimes view these materials as insignificant or assume they take on the classification of the original product. In reality, residues must be evaluated as newly generated wastes.

For example, a facility cleaning a parts washer may generate a sludge that contains spent solvent. Even if the waste solvent was originally a listed waste (e.g., F003 or F005), the generator must determine whether the residue is itself a listed waste or exhibits a characteristic. Missteps often occur when facilities rely on outdated Safety Data Sheets (SDSs) or assume that dilution or drying changes the classification.

Another scenario involves “letting residues dry out” in containers before disposal. While intended to reduce volume, this practice can be interpreted as treatment if it is done to change the waste’s characteristics (40 CFR 260.10 definition of treatment). For generators without a permit, this creates additional compliance risk.

The key takeaway is that residues are not an afterthought. They are distinct waste streams that require their own evaluation and, in some cases, can trigger more stringent requirements than expected.

Empty containers: A rule often misapplied

The empty container rule (40 CFR 261.7) is widely cited but frequently misunderstood. A container that held hazardous waste is considered empty if all wastes have been removed using common practices (e.g., pouring, pumping), and no more than one inch of residue remains (or 3% by weight for smaller containers).

In practice, facilities often overapply this rule. For example, a drum that held a listed solvent may be declared “empty” even though significant sludge remains at the bottom. Inspectors routinely check this by tipping containers or visually assessing residue. If the container does not meet the standard, it is still subject to full hazardous waste requirements.

Another common issue involves containers that held acute hazardous waste (P-listed). These have stricter emptying standards, including triple rinsing. Facilities that overlook this distinction can inadvertently manage regulated containers as non-hazardous scrap.

Importantly, even when a container meets the empty standard, any removed residue must still be evaluated as a waste. The container may be exempt, but the material removed from it is not.

Bringing it together in practice

Across these examples, a consistent pattern emerges: compliance issues arise when facilities rely on assumptions rather than applying the regulatory framework to each specific situation. Aerosols, residues, and empty containers all sit at the boundary between product use and waste management. That boundary is where most determination errors occur.

Facilities can reduce risk by standardizing evaluation procedures, training staff on common gray areas, and documenting determinations clearly. In inspections, regulators often focus less on the conclusion and more on whether the generator followed a defensible process under 40 CFR 262.11.

Key to remember: Every waste stream, no matter how small or routine, requires a fresh, documented determination at the point of generation. Management shortcuts do not replace regulatory obligations.

Hazardous waste manifest S Codes: What storage and transfer facilities need to know
2026-06-15T05:00:00Z

Hazardous waste manifest S Codes: What storage and transfer facilities need to know

Have you cracked the “S Code” yet? Starting in 2027, facilities that receive regulated waste for temporary storage and disposal must use S Codes on hazardous waste manifests. If your facility hasn’t made the switch, now’s the time!

Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires hazardous waste handlers to track shipments of regulated waste from the generating facility to final treatment, recycling, or disposal. Management Method Codes are key to hazardous waste manifests, and they also affect biennial reporting. The codes answer the vital question, “How’s the hazardous waste managed?"

Effective January 1, 2027, “S Codes” will officially replace Management MethodH141 for Storage and Transfer. EPA adopted these codes to improve the accuracy and transparency of waste tracking, specifically for wastes that travel through transfer facilities before final management. Use this overview to help your facility understand how to comply.

What are S Codes?

In January 2025, EPA added S Codes to the list of Management Method Codes, which identify the type of waste management system used to treat, recover, or dispose of a hazardous waste. Management Method Codes are used for:

  • The Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest (EPA Form 8700-22) and Continuation Sheet (EPA Form 8700-22A); and
  • The National Biennial RCRA Hazardous Waste Report (EPA Form 8700-13 A/B), known as the Biennial Report.

S Codes apply to receiving facilities (primarily treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs)) that temporarily store and then transfer regulated hazardous waste to another receiving facility without treating, recovering, or disposing of the waste. EPA established S Codes to provide more details than code H141 on waste handling activities, improving tracking and transparency. S Codes indicate two things:

  • A hazardous waste was received to be stored or transferred; and
  • The hazardous waste will be managed later by the final receiving facility using a certain method (i.e., the final management method).

EPA groups S Codes into three categories:

  • Transfer off-site for reclamation and recovery,
  • Transfer off-site for destruction or treatment prior to disposal, and
  • Transfer off-site for disposal.

Each S Code corresponds to a specific final management method. Examples include metals recovery (S010), chemical treatment (S070), and landfilling (S132).

What’s required?

On January 1, 2027, EPA will remove Management Method Code H141 for Storage and Transfer from the e-Manifest and the Biennial Report forms. As a result, hazardous waste handlers must use S Codes instead of code H141 on manifests and the Biennial Report.

S Codes apply to RCRA hazardous waste that’s transferred off-site, impacting:

  • Receiving facilities that store and transfer hazardous waste;
  • Permitted TSDFs that receive hazardous waste solely for temporary storage and transfer (i.e., it’s the facility’s only management type); and
  • Large quantity generators (LQGs) that report wastes shipped to transfer facilities on the Biennial Report.

Hazardous waste manifests

The first receiving TSDF is responsible for choosing and entering the S Codes on manifests. The storage and transfer facility must:

  • Identify the S code that best describes how the hazardous waste will be managed by the final receiving facility, and
  • Enter the S Code in Item 19 on the manifest and in Item 36 on the continuation sheet (if used).

Generators aren’t responsible for selecting or entering S Codes.

Biennial Reports

LQGs and TSDFs must use S Codes for the Biennial Report on the:

  • Waste Generation and Management (GM) Form in Item 3, and
  • Waste Received From Off-site (WR) Form in Item F.

LQGs use S Codes on the GM Form for shipments of hazardous waste off-site to a transfer facility for temporary storage and transfer.

TSDFs that receive hazardous waste for temporary storage and transfer off-site use S Codes on the WR Form. These TSDFs must also use Source Code G61 on the GM Form to report shipments of these transferred wastes.

How can facilities prepare?

Help your facility achieve a smooth shift to S Codes by January 1, 2027, with these tips:

  • Identify where your facility currently uses code H141.
  • Develop a process for transitioning to S Codes exclusively. Consider any changes your facility may need to make to its operations, such as updating software, adjusting procedures, and revising internal guidance documents.
  • Train your employees accordingly.
  • Set a deadline for making the switch to S Codes. Aim for a date well ahead of January 1, 2027, to give your facility enough time to address any issues that arise.

Key to remember: Starting in 2027, storage and transfer facilities must use S Codes in place of Management Method Code H141 on RCRA hazardous waste manifests and Biennial Reports.

Hazardous waste manifest S Codes: What storage and transfer facilities need to know
2026-06-15T05:00:00Z

Hazardous waste manifest S Codes: What storage and transfer facilities need to know

Have you cracked the “S Code” yet? Starting in 2027, facilities that receive regulated waste for temporary storage and disposal must use S Codes on hazardous waste manifests. If your facility hasn’t made the switch, now’s the time!

Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires hazardous waste handlers to track shipments of regulated waste from the generating facility to final treatment, recycling, or disposal. Management Method Codes are key to hazardous waste manifests, and they also affect biennial reporting. The codes answer the vital question, “How’s the hazardous waste managed?"

Effective January 1, 2027, “S Codes” will officially replace code H141 for Storage and Transfer. EPA adopted these codes to improve the accuracy and transparency of waste tracking, specifically for wastes that travel through transfer facilities before final management. Use this overview to help your facility understand how to comply.

What are S Codes?

In January 2025, EPA added S Codes to the list of Management Method Codes, which identify the type of waste management system used to treat, recover, or dispose of a hazardous waste. Management Method Codes are used for:

  • The Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest (EPA Form 8700-22) and Continuation Sheet (EPA Form 8700-22A); and
  • The National Biennial RCRA Hazardous Waste Report (EPA Form 8700-13 A/B), known as the Biennial Report.

S Codes apply to receiving facilities (primarily treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs)) that temporarily store and then transfer regulated hazardous waste to another receiving facility without treating, recovering, or disposing of the waste. EPA established S Codes to provide more details than code H141 on waste handling activities, improving tracking and transparency. S Codes indicate two things:

  • A hazardous waste was received to be stored or transferred; and
  • The hazardous waste will be managed later by the final receiving facility using a certain method (i.e., the final management method).

EPA groups S Codes into three categories:

  • Transfer off-site for reclamation and recovery,
  • Transfer off-site for destruction or treatment prior to disposal, and
  • Transfer off-site for disposal.

Each S Code corresponds to a specific final management method. Examples of these methods include metals recovery (S010), chemical treatment (S070), and landfilling (S132).

What’s required?

On January 1, 2027, EPA will remove Management Method Code H141 for Storage and Transfer from the e-Manifest and the Biennial Report forms. As a result, hazardous waste handlers must use S Codes instead of code H141 on manifests and the Biennial Report.

S Codes apply to RCRA hazardous waste that’s transferred off-site, impacting:

  • Receiving facilities that store and transfer hazardous waste;
  • Permitted TSDFs that receive hazardous waste solely for temporary storage and transfer (i.e., it’s the facility’s only management type); and
  • Large quantity generators (LQGs) that report wastes shipped to transfer facilities on the Biennial Report.

Hazardous waste manifests

The first receiving TSDF is responsible for choosing and entering the S Codes on manifests. The storage and transfer facility must:

  • Identify the S code that best describes how the hazardous waste will be managed by the final receiving facility, and
  • Enter the S Code in Item 19 on the manifest and in Item 36 on the continuation sheet (if used).

Generators aren’t responsible for selecting or entering S Codes.

Biennial Reports

LQGs and TSDFs must use S Codes for the Biennial Report on the:

  • Waste Generation and Management (GM) Form in Item 3, and
  • Waste Received From Off-site (WR) Form in Item F.

LQGs use S Codes on the GM Form for shipments of hazardous waste off-site to a transfer facility for temporary storage and transfer.

TSDFs that receive hazardous waste for temporary storage and transfer off-site use S Codes on the WR Form. These TSDFs must also use Source Code G61 on the GM Form to report shipments of these transferred wastes.

How can facilities prepare?

Help your facility achieve a smooth shift to S Codes by January 1, 2027, with these tips:

  • Identify where your facility currently uses code H141.
  • Develop a process for transitioning to S Codes exclusively. Consider any changes your facility may need to make to its operations, such as updating software, adjusting procedures, and revising internal guidance documents.
  • Train your employees accordingly.
  • Set a deadline for making the switch to S Codes. Aim for a date well ahead of January 1, 2027, to give your facility enough time to address any issues that arise.

Key to remember: Starting in 2027, storage and transfer facilities must use S Codes in place of code H141 on RCRA hazardous waste manifests and Biennial Reports.

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