CSB says inferno reveals gaping holes in OSHA/EPA regulations
A stunning 17-minute video from the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) animates the turn of events at a Texas terminal facility over six years ago. A broken pump led to a massive fire and significant environmental damage. Despite the process weaknesses at the facility, the video underscores a breach in OSHA and EPA regulations that CSB warns may lead to other incidents in the U.S.
The catastrophic incident
Picture an 80,000-barrel aboveground storage tank. On March 17, 2019, the circulation pump on the tank failed, allowing the release of a flammable butane-enriched naphtha blend. The release was undetected, as vapor accumulated in the area for 30 minutes. The vapor then ignited, resulting in a large-scale fire that spread to 14 other tanks. Fire crews were unable to extinguish it for three days. Black smoke cascaded into the community that was sheltering in place.
Then the petrochemicals, firefighting foams, and contaminated water broke past the secondary containment wall. An estimated 500,000 barrels of the materials then entered an adjacent bayou and reached a shipping channel contaminating a seven-mile stretch.
What did investigators find?
The CSB investigation found technical failures. The video identifies three important but missing things:
- Procedures to maintain the mechanical integrity of the pump,
- Flammable gas detection systems, and
- Remotely operated tank valves.
Outdated tank farm design was also a factor. Tanks were spaced close together and did not have subdivided containment systems.
Despite the process issues, regulatory shortfalls played a prominent role in the board’s findings. CSB Chairperson Steve Owens remarks, “A serious gap in federal regulations also contributed to the severity of this event.”
OSHA regulatory gap
The CSB video, "Terminal Faiure," points out that 29 CFR 1910.119, the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, does not cover all flammable liquids. Those stored in atmospheric tanks and kept below their normal boiling point without chilling or refrigeration are not subject to the standard. This is referred to in industry as the “flammable liquid atmospheric storage tank exemption.” See 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B).
The terminal facility company took the position that the storage of the butane-enriched naphtha product in the tank was excluded from PSM coverage. It based this stance on the exemption. According to CSB, had the OSHA PSM standard applied to the tank and its equipment, the terminal facility would have been required to implement a formal PSM system.
That system would have given the company a better chance to identify and control hazards for the tank and its equipment. Had the terminal facility put a comprehensive PSM system in place that effectively identified and controlled the tank/equipment hazards, the company could have prevented this incident, argues CSB.
EPA regulatory gap
Unlike the PSM standard, the Risk Management Program (RMP) standard at 40 CFR 68 does not include an exemption for atmospheric storage of flammable liquids. However, CSB highlights that 68.115(b)(2)(i) has a significant loophole. It reads, “[I]f the concentration of the substance is one percent or greater by weight of the mixture, then, for purposes of determining whether a threshold quantity is present at the stationary source, the entire weight of the mixture shall be treated as the regulated substance unless the owner or operator can demonstrate that the mixture itself does not have a National Fire Protection Association [NFPA] flammability hazard rating of 4.”
The terminal facility determined that the butane-enriched naphtha product contained in the tank was not subject to RMP because it was an NFPA-3a rated material. While the CSB is not validating the terminal’s NFPA “3” finding, the board speculates that had the EPA RMP standard applied to the tank and its pump, this incident likely would not have occurred.
CSB recommends closing the regulatory loopholes
In the recently released video, CSB recommends that:
- OSHA eliminate the atmospheric storage tank exemption from the PSM standard — The board insists that the atmospheric storage tank exemption in the OSHA standard continues to allow for catastrophic incidents to occur. Without PSM coverage, necessary safeguards are not being implemented for equipment that should otherwise be covered, CSB says.
- EPA modify 68.115(b)(2)(i) to expand coverage of its RMP standard to include all flammable liquids, including mixtures, with a flammability rating of NFPA-3 or higher — NFPA-3 flammability rated materials have resulted in significant explosions and fires similar to those contemplated to occur from NFPA-4 rated materials, observes CSB.
Owens emphasizes, “We believe that our recommendations, particularly to OSHA and EPA, to expand regulatory oversight of these kinds of chemicals and facilities will help ensure that a similar incident does not occur in the future.”
Key to remember
A new CSB video recounts the events involved in a massive storage tank fire. At the same time, the video warns of blind spots in OSHA PSM and EPA RMP regulations that may lead to other incidents in the U.S.