Be Part of the Ultimate Safety & Compliance Community
Trending news, knowledge-building content, and more – all personalized to you!
Transportation security is risk management. Risk management is the practice of identifying and analyzing potential security risks or threats and taking steps to prevent or reduce the risk’s impact. For motor carriers, risk management involves protecting employees, equipment, cargo, facilities, the public, and the company’s brand from harm’s way. The regulations generally do not have specific security countermeasures listed. Instead, carriers should implement industry best practices to address cargo, driver, and facility security.
Transportation security is risk management. Each motor carrier applies security measures differently depending on the circumstances.
In broad terms, risk management is the practice of:
For the average motor carrier, risk management involves protecting employees, equipment, cargo, facilities, the public, and the company’s brand from harm’s way. Topics addressed often include cargo, driver, and facility security.
Most security topics don’t have step-by-step countermeasures built into associated regulations. For example, there is no regulation telling a motor carrier how it should protect its staged cargo. Instead, this area of concern requires implementing industry best practices (e.g., fence, security guard, lighting) to help reduce the likelihood of an incident (e.g., cargo theft, vandalism).
Bottom line: Motor carriers need to integrate industry security best practices to stay ahead of potential threats.
Click to view information on creating hazardous materials security plans and hazardous materials employee security training.
A lot can happen between a load’s point of origin and its final destination. A motor carrier’s customer is expecting the shipment to arrive on time and intact. But in reality, the load is vulnerable to theft and tampering many times throughout its trip.
Protecting the public
Shipment security is more than just stolen freight and a cargo claim.
For those transporting finished or raw food products, attempts to tamper with the food chain by terrorists can result in serious illness and even death for the general public.
If carriers transport hazardous materials, commandeering a shipment of toxic chemicals can result in use of the material as a weapon (e.g., polluted water, bomb).
Cargo thefts are well-organized heists that use information, location, and opportunity to an advantage. Cargo thieves often target commercial vehicles as the vehicles leave a facility. And, of course, staged, unattended freight is always an easy steal.
Freight is stolen by all types of criminals including organized crime families, street gangs, lone professional thieves, and employees of motor carriers.
To identify preferred targets, criminals:
The techniques and methods used by cargo thieves have a direct correlation to cargo security and antitheft measures used by drivers and motor carriers.
Cargo thieves use several theft techniques on drivers and in places the load is staged. Carriers should be aware of these techniques to help the company empower itself and its drivers to keep shipments secure. Some theft techniques and scenarios are listed below.
Coerced hijackings
Technique: Thieves coerce or compel a driver to make an unplanned stop, creating a hijacking opportunity.
Scenario: The commercial driver pulls over for the purpose of rendering assistance to a supposed disabled motorist, and armed thieves, traveling in another vehicle, detain the driver and hijack the load.
Noncoerced hijackings
Technique: Perpetrators follow a targeted vehicle and wait for an opportunity when the truck driver stops or breaks (at a signal light, truck stop, rest area, etc.). Thieves have been known to follow a tractor-trailer through several states before hitting the mark.
Scenario: Once the driver stops, one or several gunmen enter the cab, detain the driver, and transport the load to a predesignated destination.
Grab-and-run thefts
Technique: Cargo thieves who have inside information of a load of high-value merchandise travel in a large van or box truck, following a targeted truck or tractor-trailer combination waiting for it to stop.
Scenario: Once the truck stops for an extended period, such as a meal break, several suspects exit a vehicle, break into the trailer, and off-load as much property as possible before the truck driver returns. In some instances, grab-and-run incidents can occur at intersections even while stopped at a stoplight.
Burglarized staged cargo
Technique: Cargo theft occurs at transportation facilities, commercial industrial parks, and intermodal railroad yards as the load is staged.
Scenario: Organized cargo theft groups enter the targeted facility, post lookouts, and spend several hours breaking into trailers and containers searching for desirable commodities to steal. Burglaries most often occur over weekends and holidays and during evening hours.
Food safety has always been a concern for motor carriers that transport those commodities. But motor carriers and drivers need to take precautions a step further by applying security measures to protect shipments tampering.
An intentional act of food contamination could cause devastating illnesses and even death to countless numbers of people.
Terrorist threats to the food supply
The farm-to-table process has multiple points that are vulnerable to terrorist attack, including the supply chain. The health and well-being of every consumer depends on the vigilance of motor carriers and their drivers.
Terrorists always look for weaknesses in those targeted. Terrorists want to use the most efficient means of causing death, destruction, and fear. Efficiency means least resistance with the greatest impact. Tampering with the nation’s food supply could satisfy these two requirements.
To fully grasp the gravity of a compromised load of finished or raw food product, individuals need to know how a specific assault would play out. Consider the following terrorist techniques.
Biological agents
Strategy: Bacteria or toxins with illness-producing effects on people, livestock, and crops are introduced to the supply chain. Bacteria that could be used to effectively contaminate the food supply include anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, and foot-and-mouth disease.
Outcome: If a terrorist uses a biological agent to contaminate food or water, the attack:
Physical agents
Strategy: Various physical hazards, such as glass or metal, could be used to intentionally contaminate food.
Outcome: This type of contamination would only affect small numbers of people because of the difficulty to contaminate large portions of the food supply. Nevertheless, even a single act of intentional contamination could have devastating and lasting consequences for a food company and its transporter.
Chemical agents
Strategy: Similar to physical agents, the use of chemicals to intentionally contaminate food would only affect small segments of the population.
Outcome: The psychological effect on the general public if death or illnesses were to occur would have a lasting impact, an end result that terrorists strive for.
Radiological agents
Strategy: Radioactive material is introduced into the food or water supply.
Outcome: Since radiation cannot be seen, smelled, felt, or tasted, people at the site of an incident will not know whether radioactive materials were involved. Internal contamination occurs when people swallow or breathe in radioactive materials, or when radioactive materials enter the body through an open wound or are absorbed through the skin. Internal exposure may lead to an increased risk of developing cancer and other adverse health effects.
During a truck and trailer’s journey, many opportunities exist for criminal or terrorist elements to either steal or tamper with the goods.
As a result, businesses have found that the use of a security seal is no longer an option, but rather a necessity to ensure the items sent are received intact and without compromise.
Keeping cargo secure
Companies should consider:
Cargo security devices include a variety of options. When determining which security seal to use, decision makers must consider:
There are several types of security devices to compare for a load, including:
For use of a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) lane into the United States and/or Canada, motor carriers can apply for membership in the following border-crossing security programs:
Membership in either customs initiative requires implementation of minimum-security criteria, including the use of an ISO 17712 high-security cargo seal. Qualifying cable and bolt seals are both acceptable.
A carrier that habitually fails to seal a load with an ISO 17712 security seal may have its C-TPAT privileges suspended if it does not address its security shortfall.
Identifying an ISO 17712 security seal
ISO 17712 high-security seal markings include:
For more information, go to U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Companies should vet drivers to verify that the person applying to transport shipments is not a security threat to themselves or the community. A responsible vetting process will include:
Employers should document the vetting process for hiring managers. Outline the steps of the process. Show examples of what to do or ask before and after an applicant is interviewed. While completing the process for each driver may seem tedious, it can save valuable time, money and frustration while keeping the company, employees, and community safe.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also to Driver Qualification and Drug and Alcohol Testing.
Perhaps the most critical step for employers in the initial driver screening process is a thorough review and verification of the written application. Responsible employers need to verify that all information on the submitted driver application is accurate and complete.
In addition to the requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSR), driver applications should ask for very specific information such as:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also to Driver Qualification and Drug and Alcohol Testing.
The following tips are provided to help carriers know what to look for — and look out for— when reviewing written application forms.
Look for:
Look out for:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
Another important information-gathering tool for employers is the in-person driver interview. Even if a motor carrier lacks the resources to conduct comprehensive background investigations on each driver applicant, all organizations possess the internal capabilities to hold personal, face-to-face interviews with each prospective driver.
In today’s environment where everyone must operate with a heightened sense of caution and alertness, the process of hiring drivers, and even non-driving employees, has become critically important to any organization’s safety and security effort.
The problem experienced at many carriers, however, is that many, if not most, driver recruiters, supervisors, and managers have received no formal or specific training on how to conduct a thorough and in-depth driver interview.
Due to the incredibly high level of driver turnover experienced in several segments of the motor carrier industry, many organizations are more concerned with keeping equipment rolling and generating revenue, than about the backgrounds of the drivers hired.
Because of the safety and security risks involved, carriers can no longer afford to be negligent when hiring.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
When interviewing an applicant, recruiters and other carrier officials should be trained to assess the candidate’s answers not only for what is revealed, but also for what is not revealed. Vague or incomplete answers to specific and detailed questions may be indicators of the applicant trying to hide information and should raise concerns (red flags).
Interviewers should fill in all gaps and dig for complete information. Applicants should be expected to provide satisfactory answers to the following red flags:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
In addition to serving as an information-gathering tool, if done improperly, the in-person driver interview can quickly become a corporate liability.
Asking questions prohibited by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during any pre-employment interview may open the door for an applicant to take legal action against the company. However, in the current safety- and security-conscious environment, motor carriers need to gather as much applicable information on a driver candidate as possible.
Lawful questions
How can carriers stay within the law while obtaining critical background information on each applicant during the in-person interview? One way is to be consistent by asking each applicant the same questions for a particular position.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
One of the most critical elements of a successful safety and security program is the pre-employment screening process. Unfortunately, the importance of this relatively straightforward task is often overlooked.
Pre-employment investigations
Motor carriers can either do background investigations on applicants, or can hire a third-party provider. Background investigations may include a review of the applicant’s:
But regardless of who completes the background investigation, the important point is that a thorough, accurate, and verified background investigation is done on each driver candidate before a hiring decision is made.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also Driver Qualifications
With respect to the regulations, investigation and inquiries into a driver’s background are designed mainly to verify the driver’s driving experience and the accuracy of the information the prospective driver provided on the application.
The regulations provide a starting point for investigating the background of prospective drivers.
Section 391.23 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) states that each motor carrier shall make the following investigations and inquiries with respect to each driver it employs:
The regulation requires previous Department of Transportation (DOT) employers to produce the requested safety performance history information.
However, any previous employers not regulated by the DOT are not obligated to respond to any inquiry.
Accepting a previous employer’s refusal or unwillingness to share information may not be an option. The potential security risks of a company not knowing exactly who it’s hiring are too high. Motor carriers need to verify all background information from prospective drivers every time.
The following tips are provided to help employers obtain the necessary previous employer information:
Warnings
Don’t just verify work history. Look for signs that the driver left previous employers under less than amiable terms.
For example, if the driver is applying for a position that pays less than a previous job, this could be a red flag that requires deeper investigation. It is highly unusual for a driver to take a significant cut in pay and benefits when switching employers.
Was the driver forced to leave because of a drug or theft incident? It’s the prospective employer’s job to find out.
Conducting a thorough and consistent investigation into the employment background of every new driver should produce the timeline and work experience information motor carriers need to make responsible and safe hiring decisions.
A final note on reference checking — expect it to be a frustrating and time-consuming process. Because of the transient nature of the motor carrier industry — characterized by high driver turnover — it is not unusual for a driver candidate to have numerous previous employers listed on the application.
But regardless of how many previous employers a prospective driver has had, if employers intend to go on with the qualification process, each one must be contacted.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
Safeguarding a shipment begins before the driver and truck even reach the shipper. Security practices include:
Until the load reaches the receiver, and its integrity is verified, the driver and motor carrier must ensure the supply chain is secured.
Driver supervision at the shipper during the loading process is important from a purely cargo claims prevention perspective. Drivers and motor carriers need to make sure that the right quantity of the right product is put on the trailer. In addition, drivers need to ensure cargo that shows any sign of damage or leakage is not loaded.
In almost all cases, once the cargo is signed for, it becomes the carrier’s responsibility.
Unauthorized cargo
Drivers must ensure there isn’t any unauthorized or unscheduled box, carton, package, or other cargo (regardless of size) being loaded on or in trailers.
Company policies and procedures should state:
Loading practices
Whenever possible, drivers should be instructed to load the most valuable cargo in the nose of the trailer and as far away from the doors as possible. In this way, unless the target is the entire trailer, criminals will have a much more difficult time getting to the most coveted (valuable) freight.
Reviewing shipping papers
All load-related documentation should be thoroughly reviewed and verified by the driver. Drivers must confirm that the right amount of the right product(s) was in fact loaded on the trailer. Any discrepancies need to be reported and resolved before the paperwork is signed or the trailer is sealed. Only after the driver is satisfied that everything is in order, should the bill of lading be signed and the trailer sealed.
Sealing the load
When putting a security seal of any type on a trailer, drivers should have a shipper representative present as a witness.
A suggested method of sealing the shipment involves the acronym VVTT. This same process should also be practiced after any stops along the way:
Shipper load-and-count trailers
A driver should verify the integrity of a security seal that the shipper put on a loaded trailer prior to the driver arriving.
The driver should ensure:
The following driver actions while on the road can help reduce the likelihood of cargo theft or tampering and personal injury.
When leaving the shipper
Employers should train drivers to be especially alert when leaving a shipper. Criminals have been known to wait outside of distribution centers to follow trucks until the vehicle stops. Tell drivers to be aware near signal-regulated highway on- and off-ramps. These are prime vehicle hijack areas.
When leaving a shipper, drivers should:
Driver check-ins
Companies can use regular driver check-ins help keep the motor carrier informed and up to date. A daily check-in with supervisors while out on the road can serve as an early warning system if a driver fails to make normal contact.
Refrain from discussing load-related information
Information — such as load content, pick-up and delivery schedules, and routing — should never be discussed with anyone while out on the road. Train employees accordingly.
Stop and park safely and securely
Train drivers to only stop when needed at reputable truck stops or high-traffic rest areas.
Best practices include:
Be suspicious of anyone asking the driver to stop
A frequent ploy used by hijackers is to create a scenario that forces or compels the driver to stop.
Drivers who become a victim of hijacking should:
Inspect the vehicle
The equipment should be inspected after each stop or rest period. In addition to conducting a normal inspection of safety-related items, drivers should also check security seals and look for anything unusual or suspicious on the vehicle.
When drivers arrive at a destination, the process of unloading is fairly straightforward. After all, the hardest and most dangerous part of the trip is over. The driver has arrived safely, and the cargo remained secure and intact.
Employers should train drivers to understand that the two main unloading activities a driver should be involved with include:
Recheck trailer and cargo integrity
Load security ends with the driver and responsible receiving personnel working together to unload the trailer.
Unloading procedures are as follows. The driver and receiver:
Supervise and complete unloading activities
During the unloading process, the driver should report any discrepancies or damage to the motor carrier as soon as possible.
Driver supervision of the unloading process is recommended mainly for cargo claims protection for the carrier.
A motor carrier facility houses valuable equipment and cargo that thieves would love to gain access to. And those carriers that transport and often store hazardous materials must be especially mindful of those who want to steal the commodity for terrorist activities.
Information on dispatches, routes, and freight is often sought after by cargo thieves and terrorists, so carriers need to incorporate security best practices into their operations department.
An in-house maintenance shop deserves special attention when developing a security plan. The shop is a unique area with a lot of inventory and a lot of activity. Mechanics, drivers, and others are coming and going; vehicles, tools, parts, and supplies are everywhere; and hazardous materials are stored there. Keeping the maintenance shop safe and secure is a necessity.
Entrances. Maintenance bay doors should be secured against unauthorized entry or exit. Make sure the doors can’t be forced open, and that the controls can’t be operated from the outside by an unauthorized person. Similarly, other doors leading into the shop should be secured.
Hazardous materials. Make sure all hazardous materials (gasoline, oxygen/acetylene tanks, used oil, antifreeze, painting supplies, chemicals, etc.) are stored in secure areas and protected from theft or unauthorized use.
Parts and equipment. Parts, tools, and other equipment should be protected against theft and tampering. If possible, use a computerized inventory system to keep track of inventory. No matter what type of inventory system is used, make sure it can’t be tampered with. Keep storage areas locked when not in use and consider marking equipment in a way that will help police find the owner. Keep photographs of more valuable equipment to help law enforcement recover it if it is stolen.
Typically, dispatch operations of most motor carriers serve as the nerve center of the entire organization. Virtually every bit of critical and sensitive information flows through the operations department, including dispatch records and load sheets that have:
Because of this, security awareness must be especially acute in operations, particularly for those carriers hauling hazmat or high-value cargo.
Fortunately, securing a motor carrier’s dispatch can be a relatively painless process. In most situations, common sense, attention to detail, and some basic housekeeping rules are the tools needed to increase the security of a typical operations department.
The following guidelines are provided to help increase the overall security of any motor carrier’s operations department:
As with most security issues, yard security is all about limiting, controlling, deterring, or outright denying access to transportation yards and facilities by unauthorized persons and vehicles.
While no yard security plan is infallible, a comprehensive and well-designed yard security system can greatly reduce the chance of a motor carrier becoming the target of criminals or terrorists.
A company should:
Yard security begins at the point(s) of entry. Motor carriers must have a means of observing, and even recording, traffic in and out of facilities.
At a minimum, carriers should develop and implement yard access control procedures that include a written log of all traffic going in and out of the yard. This log should record such things as:
The log should be reviewed at the end of each business day, and each daily log should be retained for a minimum of six months.
Additional yard access control procedures motor carriers should consider include:
Controlling access to terminal facilities and yards needs to mean more than monitoring traffic. It also needs to serve as a major deterrent and obstacle to would-be cargo thieves, vandals, or other criminal elements.
A combination of restrictive signs, security fencing and gates, and a system to monitor traffic in and out of the yard will establish such a deterrent.
Perimeter fencing and signage are some of the most important elements of a motor carrier’s yard security.
Perimeter fencing
The perimeter of any motor carrier’s yard facility should be protected by a security fence to keep unauthorized persons out and to provide some level of privacy. Look for the following when planning or maintaining a perimeter fence:
Though it may only be a psychological deterrent, carriers should place enough No Trespassing signs around the perimeter of the facility so that one is visible from any approach to the facility.
The value of adequate exterior security lighting as a deterrent to crime cannot be overemphasized. When compared to the potential losses of cargo theft, exterior lighting is a cost-effective security measure that all motor carriers should seriously consider.
The entire facility (buildings, parking lots, fueling areas, doorways, perimeter fencing, etc.) should have adequate lighting. Intruders generally prefer unlit or dark areas.
Lighting should allow security personnel to see all sensitive areas (including the inside of vehicles) and all areas of the perimeter. Watch for areas where the light cones do not overlap and provide a dark corridor through which an intruder could pass unnoticed. In addition:
When choosing, reviewing, or evaluating the need for exterior lighting, do the required homework. There are many high-tech as well as conventional options available, from motion-sensing lights to lights built into vehicle barriers. If electrical costs are a concern, consider installing motion-sensing lights on less-critical areas.
Due to a variety of reasons, most motor carriers find it necessary to stage loaded trailers in carrier yards and terminal facilities. When this need arises, there are increased security risks. Remember, a sitting trailer is a more attractive target than one that is rolling down the highway.
Because of this, motor carriers need to develop and implement a few basic loaded or staged trailer security procedures. Specifically:
A motor carrier company and its employees should be trained to act as custodians of security to guard cargo and borders from criminals or acts of terror. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an organization consisting of several critical agencies that help prevent terrorist attacks with the United States, reduce American vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that might occur.
Role for motor carriers
Motor carriers may be required to adhere to regulations and laws on securing freight through DHS and its agencies. Employers and drivers should know the mission and purpose of the DHS, the Transportation Security Administration, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. When entering Canada, carriers must be familiar with the Canada Border Services Agency. This will help employers write important security polices and vet the drivers transporting at-risk cargo.
Security credentials
Drivers need specific security credentials to cross borders, transport hazardous materials, and enter secured areas at U.S. seaports.
See hazardous materials security plans and hazardous materials employee security training.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) became a Cabinet-level organization in late 2002 with a primary mission to help prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism on U.S. soil.
DHS mission
The mission of the DHS includes:
DHS will attempt to do so by ensuring safe and secure borders, welcoming lawful immigrants and visitors, and promoting the free flow of commerce.
The organization
The agencies within the DHS are housed in one of five major directorates:
See Security credentials.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was housed within the United States Department of Transportation when it was initially created. Within a short period, TSA was transitioned into the Department of Homeland Security based on law from Congress. Though many equate TSA with airline security, its scope extends to all modes of transportation.
TSA is charged with:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) became an official agency of the Department of Homeland Security in early 2003, combining employees from the Department of Agriculture, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, and the U.S. Customs Service.
The goal of unifying the border agencies was to improve the way the U.S. government manages the border. CBP combined skills and resources to make the agency more effective and efficient than when border responsibilities were fragmented into four agencies, in three different departments of government.
A unified goal
Included in those ranks are inspectors, canine enforcement officers, border patrol agents, trade specialists, and mission support staff.
As the single unified border agency of the United States, the CBP mission is vitally important to the protection of America and the American people. The CBP strategy to improve security and facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and travel includes:
See U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism; Free and Secure Trade (FAST); and Security credentials.
See Security credentials; Canada’s Partners in Protection; and Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is a federal law enforcement agency that is responsible for border control (i.e. protection and surveillance), immigration enforcement, and customs services in Canada and facilitates trade and people across Canadian borders by air, land, and sea while ensuring the safety and security of Canadian citizens.
The CBSA is the Canadian equivalent to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
Strategies
The strategies implemented by CBSA are similar to the strategies of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and CBP. The U.S. and Canada have collaborated on several programs to protect citizens while ensuring the smooth flow of goods across the border.
Programs like the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, Transportation Worker Identification Credential, Free and Secure Trade, and hazardous materials endorsement are designed to vet anyone who might be security risk when entering the United States or engaging is specific activities. Motor carriers must ensure drivers are properly credentialled before assigning loads.
The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) is the result of a law that required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Department of State (DOS) to develop a plan that would require U.S. citizens and foreign nationals to present a passport (or other appropriate secure identity and citizenship documentation) when entering or re-entering the United States.
The goal of the WHTI is to strengthen border security while also making it easier for legitimate foreign visitors, as well as U.S. citizens, to travel into the United States. By requiring every traveler to have a passport or other standardized entry documentation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers spend more time scrutinizing those travelers who may aim to cause U.S. citizens and visitors harm.
The following documents meet the initiative’s requirements for U.S. citizens and nonimmigrant aliens from Canada entering the United States:
U.S. lawful permanent residents can continue to use a permanent resident card (Form I-551) or other valid evidence of permanent residence status. Mexican nationals, including children, are currently required to present a passport with visa or a border crossing card, and therefore there is little to no expectation of change from WHTI.
Enhanced Driver’s Licenses (EDLs)
Rather than go through the application process to obtain a passport, many private citizens and commercial travelers are looking into which driver’s licenses satisfy WHTI.
CBP designated specific enhanced driver’s licenses (EDLs) and identification documents (IDs) as acceptable documents under WHTI. EDLs and IDs issued by several states and provinces are included. These documents may be used to denote identity and citizenship of, as appropriate, U.S. or Canadian citizens entering the United States from within the Western Hemisphere at land and seaports of entry.
EDLs make it easier for travelers to cross the border into the United States because they include:
According to CBP, no personally identifiable information is stored on the card’s RFID chip or can be transmitted electronically by the card. The card uses a unique identification number that links to information contained in a secure DHS database. This number does not contain any personally identifiable information.
Details of WHTI are outlined on both CBP’s website (cbp.gov) and the U.S. Department of State (state.gov).
Port employees, longshoremen, mariners, truckers, and others who require unescorted access to secure areas of ports and vessels would be required to be vetted under the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program.
What is the TWIC?
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) jointly created and manage the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. Together they oversee the various requirements and applicability to the program, including the enrollment process, disqualifying crimes, usage procedures, fees, and other requirements for workers, port owners, and operators. Port employees, longshoremen, mariners, truckers, and others who require unescorted access to secure areas of ports and vessels would be required to be vetted under the TWIC program.
In the case of the trucking industry, this would also include any driver helpers or other passengers accompanying the driver in the commercial motor vehicle. If employers have a policy that allows family members to ride along, family members would also be expected to present the credential to gain access to the port facility.
The security requirements to hold a TWIC mimic those for individuals applying for or renewing a hazardous materials endorsement. In fact, the TWIC requirements are included within the same area of regulations as the hazardous materials endorsement background investigation, 49 CFR Part 1572, Credentialing and Security Threat Assessments.
An individual who lacks lawful presence and certain immigration status in the United States, has a connection to terrorist activity, has been determined to lack mental capacity, or was convicted of certain crimes will be ineligible for a TWIC.
TWIC application process
The enrollment process for an applicant is expected to take approximately 15 minutes. TSA will use a combination of fixed and mobile enrollment stations to make the enrollment process as efficient as possible for applicants and owners or operators.
Appointments are encouraged to save applicants time but are not required, and walk-ins are welcome. Appointments to visit an enrollment center must be made via phone at: (855) DHS-UES1.
At the enrollment center, the applicant must:
Applicants who have completed a comparable threat assessment, such as a hazardous materials endorsement, Free and Secure Trade (FAST) card, merchant mariner’s document (MMD), or merchant mariner license, and wish to pay a reduced TWIC fee because the applicant does not need another threat assessment, must present a hazardous materials endorsement, FAST card, MMD, or merchant mariner license at enrollment.
Applicants will be notified by email or phone as specified during enrollment when the TWIC is available at the enrollment center. Applicants must pick up the TWIC at the enrollment center at which the applicant applied, unless a different location is specified at the time of enrollment. TWICs are usually issued within 6-8 weeks after enrollment.
Once an applicant is notified that a TWIC is ready for pick-up, the applicant has the choice of either making an appointment for card activation (which is recommended) or going directly to an enrollment center (as a walk-in). At that time, the applicant’s identity will be verified by providing a government-issued photo ID, matching the person’s fingerprint to one stored on the TWIC, selecting and inputting a personal identification number (PIN), and reviewing and agreeing to the cardholder responsibilities. Once these steps have occurred, the applicant’s TWIC is activated.
Smart card technology
The TWIC credential itself is a Smart Card (i.e., a card with a small integrated circuit chip embedded in the card).
Participation in the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program for drivers not only benefits the drivers’ employers, but it also assists the drivers in the border crossing experience.
The benefits of being an approved driver in the FAST Commercial Driver Program include:
In addition to the standard Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)/FAST benefits, drivers may be able to use this background investigation in other mandated security programs.
FAST vetting process used for other programs
The FAST background investigation uses similar, and in some instances, the same databases as other U.S. driver vetting programs. Rather than duplicate the process, placing an unnecessary burden on the driver and motor carrier, the FAST card may be used for dual purposes for the requirements below.
FAST reciprocity for HAZMAT endorsement. According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), drivers licensed in Canada or Mexico to commercially transport hazardous materials will be required to undergo a background check under the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) FAST program before transporting placarded amounts of hazardous materials (hazmat) in the United States.
Commercial drivers licensed in Canada or Mexico be restricted from transporting hazardous materials, including explosives, within the U.S. unless drivers have undergone a background check similar to that required for U.S. operators with a hazmat endorsement. TSA has determined that the FAST card, issued by CBP, satisfies the vetting standard requirements as set forth under SAFETEA-LU for commercial vehicle operators registered to operate in Mexico or Canada.
The Hazmat Threat Assessment Program, under the direction of TSA, requires commercial truck drivers applying to obtain, renew, or transfer the hazardous materials endorsement (HME) on the person’s state-issued commercial driver’s licenses (CDL) to undergo security threat assessments conducted by TSA.
FAST reciprocity for transporting explosives. Drivers licensed in Canada or Mexico who transport explosive materials come under the broader definition of hazmat (see section immediately above) and will ensure that drivers licensed to carry explosives are fully vetted by CBP before transporting explosives.
FAST card satisfies WHTI. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), which requires either a passport or other acceptable travel document, was required to enter the United States via a land entry from any point in North America. These travel documents are also required of U.S. citizens and alien residents who wish to re-enter the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has indicated that the FAST card is an acceptable travel documents for land entry.
FAST card qualifications
To qualify for the FAST program, a driver must be a citizen or permanent resident of the United States (U.S.), Mexico, or Canada, be age 18 or over, and possess a valid driver’s license. A driver must be admissible into the United States and Canada under applicable immigration laws.
In the case of admissibility for the U.S.-Canadian border, both countries must approve the application. Failure to meet the requirements of both countries will result in the denial of the application. A driver can also be disqualified for the following reasons:
When a driver is approved for the FAST program, the driver must comply with the terms and conditions of the program. Drivers:
The investigation of commercial drivers transporting hazardous materials (hazmat) helps determine if the driver poses a security risk.
Commercial drivers who have hazardous material endorsements on their commercial drivers’ licenses (CDL) will be required to undergo a routine background records check that includes a review of the driver’s:
Any applicant with a conviction (military or civilian) for certain violent felonies over the past seven years, or who has been found mentally incompetent, will not be permitted to obtain or renew a hazmat endorsement.
The checks will verify that the driver is a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident.
State driver’s licensing agencies
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) rules:
Applicants will be subject to a name-based FBI criminal history records check and a check of federal databases.
Current drivers applying to renew or transfer a hazmat endorsement and all new applicants must provide fingerprints.
Under both the FMCSA and TSA rules, no state may issue, renew, or transfer a hazmat license unless TSA has notified the state that the individual holding the endorsement does not pose a security threat.
States must notify holders of hazmat endorsements at least 60 days prior to the expiration date of the CDL or hazmat endorsement that holders must pass a TSA screening process as part of any application for renewal for hazmat endorsement.
The driver will be notified that the person must file a renewal application as soon as possible, but no later than 30 days before the date of expiration of the endorsement. The application form includes questions regarding disqualifying crimes, mental illness, denouncing of American citizenship, alien status, and military service (date and type of discharge).
Drivers are informed under federal regulations to disclose to the state of licensing within 24 hours of being convicted or found guilty by reason of insanity of any disqualifying crime, or if drivers are adjudicated to a mental institution.
The TSA will notify the state if no threat is found on a particular driver. Drivers who do not successfully complete the TSA security screening will not be issued a hazmat endorsement. Drivers may still hold a CDL, but absent of the endorsement.
Note that the state may require a specific action on the part of the driver once the driver receives notification from TSA. Please check with the state licensing agency for clarification.
Appeals process
The regulations provide an appeal process for cases in which the database information is incorrect, to ensure that no driver loses the hazmat endorsement due to inaccurate records.
Also, drivers who committed a disqualifying offense, were found to be mentally incompetent, or were committed to a mental institution may apply for a waiver if the person proves to be rehabilitated and capable of transporting hazmat safely.
Only drivers applying for hazmat endorsements are affected by this rule. If disqualified to hold hazmat endorsements, drivers may continue to transport all non-hazardous cargo.
Canadian and Mexican drivers
Canadian and Mexican drivers who haul hazmat into the United States may only do so if the drivers possess a valid Free and Secure Trade (FAST) card or Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC).
The FMCSA and TSA have deemed the FAST and TWIC vetting processes equivalent to the state endorsement process. U.S. Customs and Border Protection enforce the rule at the border.
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) includes United States importers, customs brokers, terminal operators, carriers, and some foreign manufacturers.
C-TPAT is a voluntary public/private cooperative program offered by the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) to the international business community. The program’s intent is to bring CBP and industry together in a closer working relationship to ensure national security at and beyond the U.S. border. C-TPAT’s concentration is focused on the various components and elements of the global supply chain, which includes motor carrier companies.
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary incentive-based program in which the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) partners with members of the trade community to strengthen global supply chain security and prevent the supply chain from being compromised by terrorist organizations.
C-TPAT is open to:
During the supply chain risk assessment phase of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) membership process, many organizations have discovered outdated procedures and inefficiencies in the supply chain. This evaluation of the supply chain allows organizations to optimize internal and external management of assets and functions while at the same time enhance security.
Enhanced security practices and procedures together may mitigate the risk of loss, damage, and theft, and reduce the likelihood of the introduction of potentially dangerous elements into the global supply chain.
Consider the following additional benefits of participating in C-TPAT:
Through the successful collaboration between the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the trade community, C-TPAT enhances the security and efficiency of legitimate trade.
Partners in Protection (PIP) is a cooperative effort between private industry and Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to enhance Canadian border security, combat organized crime and terrorism, increase awareness of customs compliance issues, and help detect and prevent contraband smuggling.
The program is similar to its American counterpart, Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Participation in PIP is required for highway carriers that want to participate in the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program to enter into Canada using the expedited “green” lane.
See Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
Canada and the U.S. signed a mutual recognition arrangement to align Partners in Protection (PIP) with the U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. The arrangement recognizes compatibility between Canada and U.S. cargo security programs.
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) both agree to apply high security standards and perform similar validations when approving companies for membership in the respective programs.
The mutual recognition will make it easier for organizations to be eligible for both PIP and C-TPAT, although a separate application must be submitted for both.
In addition, only one site validation may be necessary for applicants of both programs. But both customs agencies still reserve the right to perform to respective validations. This alignment has a goal of positioning organizations to achieve international recognition in other programs.
The Partners in Protection (PIP) program is open to eligible organizations, including importers, exporters, highway carriers, marine carriers, air carriers, rail carriers, customs brokers, couriers, warehouse operators, freight forwarders, and shipping agents.
Applicants may also own or operate facilities in Canada that are directly involved in the importation and exportation of commercial goods, or in a U.S. company applying for a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) membership. The applicant must be of good standing.
Participants fall into two categories: members and associates.
The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program is a bilateral initiative between:
The program is designed to ensure security and safety while enhancing the economic prosperity of the three countries involved.
FAST is a harmonized clearance process for known low-risk shipments. Processing is based upon advanced electronic transmission of information. FAST is the first completely paperless cargo release mechanism put into place by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
FAST is a benefit of participating in the CBP’s Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) for U.S. entry and/or Partners in Protection (PIP) for Canadian entry. Many have mistakenly thought the program is stand-alone.
It takes three elements to use the FAST lane to enter the U.S. including:
If one of these is not in place, that shipment is unable to use the FAST lane. For shipments entering Canada, substitute PIP for C-TPAT.
In addition, anyone occupying the cab of the commercial motor vehicle must possess a FAST card to use the FAST lane for that trip. Occupants would also need appropriate immigration papers to enter the U.S.
See Canada’s Partners in Protection (PIP)
See U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program is open to carriers who:
Carriers seeking FAST clearance into Canada must be bonded and participate in the Canadian Customs Self-Assessment (CSA) program.
Highway carriers have four FAST participant options.
Expedited clearance:
The application process differs for each option.
Organizations that participate in FAST will experience the following benefits:
For any truck required to report its arrival to the United States that has commercial cargo aboard, the inbound truck carrier and the U.S. importer or the importer’s Customs broker must submit cargo information electronically no later than either:
The incoming truck carrier must present the required information through one of the following methods:
The mandatory use of ACE replaces the Pre-arrival Processing System (PAPS) and Border Release Advance Screening and Selectivity (BRASS).
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) portal requires the manual entry of shipping information. The secured portal allows for some elements (drivers, units) to be stored and reused on the site, but many items that are unique to each shipment must be keyed in each time. The data items that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reviews in advance of arriving at the border include the description of the goods, quantity, tractor/trailers, and driver.
The ACE portal requires data elements included in most dispatch software, but due to the nature of the portal, it must be entered manually and cannot be uploaded from these existing programs. Use of company software would have to meet specifications and be connected to the CBP’s Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) to import information.
Economic advantages
To some, this keying in of information is time-consuming, cumbersome, and a duplication of processes since much of the information is contained in-house in other software applications. But for the small or mid-sized organization, or the occasional border carrier, it may be a more economical means to satisfy the requirement versus investing in the purchase or development of software.
If carriers are interested in filing Electronic Truck Manifests using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the company must write a letter of intent.
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Information Systems Security Policy requires all participants that transmit electronic data directly to CBP’s automated systems to file a signed Interconnection Security Agreement.
If the carrier is using a connection already established through a Service Center or Value Added Network, an Internet Security and Acceleration may not be required.
Vendor software
Some organizations have opted to use one of the software vendors who have approval from CBP. Many of the programs combine the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) e-Manifest information with daily dispatch software rather than duplicate information.
CBP maintains a list of approved vendors for truck manifests. These programs have been tested and interface with EDI.
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) Customs Action Plan was launched in April 2000. A major initiative within this plan is the Advance Commercial Information (ACI) program.
Under these rules, carriers and forwarders involved in the importation of goods are required to provide electronic data to CBSA about the trade goods being imported.
Timing of information
Often referred to as the e-Manifest rule, highway carriers are required to submit the electronic transmission of cargo information one hour prior to arrival at the border.
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has approved the following electronic data interchange (EDI) transmission methods to submit an e-Manifest to the agency:
To use the e-Manifest portal, two accounts must be set up: Portal User and Business.
Portal User accounts are created for each person who will be working in the Portal on the drivers behalf. Portal Users must provide CBSA with the user’s name, email address, and telephone number.
Business accounts are created by an authorized representative of the business called an account owner. The accounts will have to provide a valid carrier code and Shared Secret. The Shared Secret is a temporary access code that is issued to a business that wishes to register for a Portal account. Only CBSA and a legal representative of the company will have access to this information. Once issued, Shared Secrets will be sent by mail to the authorized officers who made the requests.
A lot can happen between a load’s point of origin and its final destination. A motor carrier’s customer is expecting the shipment to arrive on time and intact. But in reality, the load is vulnerable to theft and tampering many times throughout its trip.
Protecting the public
Shipment security is more than just stolen freight and a cargo claim.
For those transporting finished or raw food products, attempts to tamper with the food chain by terrorists can result in serious illness and even death for the general public.
If carriers transport hazardous materials, commandeering a shipment of toxic chemicals can result in use of the material as a weapon (e.g., polluted water, bomb).
Cargo thefts are well-organized heists that use information, location, and opportunity to an advantage. Cargo thieves often target commercial vehicles as the vehicles leave a facility. And, of course, staged, unattended freight is always an easy steal.
Freight is stolen by all types of criminals including organized crime families, street gangs, lone professional thieves, and employees of motor carriers.
To identify preferred targets, criminals:
The techniques and methods used by cargo thieves have a direct correlation to cargo security and antitheft measures used by drivers and motor carriers.
Cargo thieves use several theft techniques on drivers and in places the load is staged. Carriers should be aware of these techniques to help the company empower itself and its drivers to keep shipments secure. Some theft techniques and scenarios are listed below.
Coerced hijackings
Technique: Thieves coerce or compel a driver to make an unplanned stop, creating a hijacking opportunity.
Scenario: The commercial driver pulls over for the purpose of rendering assistance to a supposed disabled motorist, and armed thieves, traveling in another vehicle, detain the driver and hijack the load.
Noncoerced hijackings
Technique: Perpetrators follow a targeted vehicle and wait for an opportunity when the truck driver stops or breaks (at a signal light, truck stop, rest area, etc.). Thieves have been known to follow a tractor-trailer through several states before hitting the mark.
Scenario: Once the driver stops, one or several gunmen enter the cab, detain the driver, and transport the load to a predesignated destination.
Grab-and-run thefts
Technique: Cargo thieves who have inside information of a load of high-value merchandise travel in a large van or box truck, following a targeted truck or tractor-trailer combination waiting for it to stop.
Scenario: Once the truck stops for an extended period, such as a meal break, several suspects exit a vehicle, break into the trailer, and off-load as much property as possible before the truck driver returns. In some instances, grab-and-run incidents can occur at intersections even while stopped at a stoplight.
Burglarized staged cargo
Technique: Cargo theft occurs at transportation facilities, commercial industrial parks, and intermodal railroad yards as the load is staged.
Scenario: Organized cargo theft groups enter the targeted facility, post lookouts, and spend several hours breaking into trailers and containers searching for desirable commodities to steal. Burglaries most often occur over weekends and holidays and during evening hours.
Food safety has always been a concern for motor carriers that transport those commodities. But motor carriers and drivers need to take precautions a step further by applying security measures to protect shipments tampering.
An intentional act of food contamination could cause devastating illnesses and even death to countless numbers of people.
Terrorist threats to the food supply
The farm-to-table process has multiple points that are vulnerable to terrorist attack, including the supply chain. The health and well-being of every consumer depends on the vigilance of motor carriers and their drivers.
Terrorists always look for weaknesses in those targeted. Terrorists want to use the most efficient means of causing death, destruction, and fear. Efficiency means least resistance with the greatest impact. Tampering with the nation’s food supply could satisfy these two requirements.
To fully grasp the gravity of a compromised load of finished or raw food product, individuals need to know how a specific assault would play out. Consider the following terrorist techniques.
Biological agents
Strategy: Bacteria or toxins with illness-producing effects on people, livestock, and crops are introduced to the supply chain. Bacteria that could be used to effectively contaminate the food supply include anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, and foot-and-mouth disease.
Outcome: If a terrorist uses a biological agent to contaminate food or water, the attack:
Physical agents
Strategy: Various physical hazards, such as glass or metal, could be used to intentionally contaminate food.
Outcome: This type of contamination would only affect small numbers of people because of the difficulty to contaminate large portions of the food supply. Nevertheless, even a single act of intentional contamination could have devastating and lasting consequences for a food company and its transporter.
Chemical agents
Strategy: Similar to physical agents, the use of chemicals to intentionally contaminate food would only affect small segments of the population.
Outcome: The psychological effect on the general public if death or illnesses were to occur would have a lasting impact, an end result that terrorists strive for.
Radiological agents
Strategy: Radioactive material is introduced into the food or water supply.
Outcome: Since radiation cannot be seen, smelled, felt, or tasted, people at the site of an incident will not know whether radioactive materials were involved. Internal contamination occurs when people swallow or breathe in radioactive materials, or when radioactive materials enter the body through an open wound or are absorbed through the skin. Internal exposure may lead to an increased risk of developing cancer and other adverse health effects.
During a truck and trailer’s journey, many opportunities exist for criminal or terrorist elements to either steal or tamper with the goods.
As a result, businesses have found that the use of a security seal is no longer an option, but rather a necessity to ensure the items sent are received intact and without compromise.
Keeping cargo secure
Companies should consider:
Cargo security devices include a variety of options. When determining which security seal to use, decision makers must consider:
There are several types of security devices to compare for a load, including:
For use of a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) lane into the United States and/or Canada, motor carriers can apply for membership in the following border-crossing security programs:
Membership in either customs initiative requires implementation of minimum-security criteria, including the use of an ISO 17712 high-security cargo seal. Qualifying cable and bolt seals are both acceptable.
A carrier that habitually fails to seal a load with an ISO 17712 security seal may have its C-TPAT privileges suspended if it does not address its security shortfall.
Identifying an ISO 17712 security seal
ISO 17712 high-security seal markings include:
For more information, go to U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Cargo thefts are well-organized heists that use information, location, and opportunity to an advantage. Cargo thieves often target commercial vehicles as the vehicles leave a facility. And, of course, staged, unattended freight is always an easy steal.
Freight is stolen by all types of criminals including organized crime families, street gangs, lone professional thieves, and employees of motor carriers.
To identify preferred targets, criminals:
The techniques and methods used by cargo thieves have a direct correlation to cargo security and antitheft measures used by drivers and motor carriers.
Cargo thieves use several theft techniques on drivers and in places the load is staged. Carriers should be aware of these techniques to help the company empower itself and its drivers to keep shipments secure. Some theft techniques and scenarios are listed below.
Coerced hijackings
Technique: Thieves coerce or compel a driver to make an unplanned stop, creating a hijacking opportunity.
Scenario: The commercial driver pulls over for the purpose of rendering assistance to a supposed disabled motorist, and armed thieves, traveling in another vehicle, detain the driver and hijack the load.
Noncoerced hijackings
Technique: Perpetrators follow a targeted vehicle and wait for an opportunity when the truck driver stops or breaks (at a signal light, truck stop, rest area, etc.). Thieves have been known to follow a tractor-trailer through several states before hitting the mark.
Scenario: Once the driver stops, one or several gunmen enter the cab, detain the driver, and transport the load to a predesignated destination.
Grab-and-run thefts
Technique: Cargo thieves who have inside information of a load of high-value merchandise travel in a large van or box truck, following a targeted truck or tractor-trailer combination waiting for it to stop.
Scenario: Once the truck stops for an extended period, such as a meal break, several suspects exit a vehicle, break into the trailer, and off-load as much property as possible before the truck driver returns. In some instances, grab-and-run incidents can occur at intersections even while stopped at a stoplight.
Burglarized staged cargo
Technique: Cargo theft occurs at transportation facilities, commercial industrial parks, and intermodal railroad yards as the load is staged.
Scenario: Organized cargo theft groups enter the targeted facility, post lookouts, and spend several hours breaking into trailers and containers searching for desirable commodities to steal. Burglaries most often occur over weekends and holidays and during evening hours.
Cargo thieves use several theft techniques on drivers and in places the load is staged. Carriers should be aware of these techniques to help the company empower itself and its drivers to keep shipments secure. Some theft techniques and scenarios are listed below.
Coerced hijackings
Technique: Thieves coerce or compel a driver to make an unplanned stop, creating a hijacking opportunity.
Scenario: The commercial driver pulls over for the purpose of rendering assistance to a supposed disabled motorist, and armed thieves, traveling in another vehicle, detain the driver and hijack the load.
Noncoerced hijackings
Technique: Perpetrators follow a targeted vehicle and wait for an opportunity when the truck driver stops or breaks (at a signal light, truck stop, rest area, etc.). Thieves have been known to follow a tractor-trailer through several states before hitting the mark.
Scenario: Once the driver stops, one or several gunmen enter the cab, detain the driver, and transport the load to a predesignated destination.
Grab-and-run thefts
Technique: Cargo thieves who have inside information of a load of high-value merchandise travel in a large van or box truck, following a targeted truck or tractor-trailer combination waiting for it to stop.
Scenario: Once the truck stops for an extended period, such as a meal break, several suspects exit a vehicle, break into the trailer, and off-load as much property as possible before the truck driver returns. In some instances, grab-and-run incidents can occur at intersections even while stopped at a stoplight.
Burglarized staged cargo
Technique: Cargo theft occurs at transportation facilities, commercial industrial parks, and intermodal railroad yards as the load is staged.
Scenario: Organized cargo theft groups enter the targeted facility, post lookouts, and spend several hours breaking into trailers and containers searching for desirable commodities to steal. Burglaries most often occur over weekends and holidays and during evening hours.
Food safety has always been a concern for motor carriers that transport those commodities. But motor carriers and drivers need to take precautions a step further by applying security measures to protect shipments tampering.
An intentional act of food contamination could cause devastating illnesses and even death to countless numbers of people.
Terrorist threats to the food supply
The farm-to-table process has multiple points that are vulnerable to terrorist attack, including the supply chain. The health and well-being of every consumer depends on the vigilance of motor carriers and their drivers.
Terrorists always look for weaknesses in those targeted. Terrorists want to use the most efficient means of causing death, destruction, and fear. Efficiency means least resistance with the greatest impact. Tampering with the nation’s food supply could satisfy these two requirements.
To fully grasp the gravity of a compromised load of finished or raw food product, individuals need to know how a specific assault would play out. Consider the following terrorist techniques.
Biological agents
Strategy: Bacteria or toxins with illness-producing effects on people, livestock, and crops are introduced to the supply chain. Bacteria that could be used to effectively contaminate the food supply include anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, and foot-and-mouth disease.
Outcome: If a terrorist uses a biological agent to contaminate food or water, the attack:
Physical agents
Strategy: Various physical hazards, such as glass or metal, could be used to intentionally contaminate food.
Outcome: This type of contamination would only affect small numbers of people because of the difficulty to contaminate large portions of the food supply. Nevertheless, even a single act of intentional contamination could have devastating and lasting consequences for a food company and its transporter.
Chemical agents
Strategy: Similar to physical agents, the use of chemicals to intentionally contaminate food would only affect small segments of the population.
Outcome: The psychological effect on the general public if death or illnesses were to occur would have a lasting impact, an end result that terrorists strive for.
Radiological agents
Strategy: Radioactive material is introduced into the food or water supply.
Outcome: Since radiation cannot be seen, smelled, felt, or tasted, people at the site of an incident will not know whether radioactive materials were involved. Internal contamination occurs when people swallow or breathe in radioactive materials, or when radioactive materials enter the body through an open wound or are absorbed through the skin. Internal exposure may lead to an increased risk of developing cancer and other adverse health effects.
During a truck and trailer’s journey, many opportunities exist for criminal or terrorist elements to either steal or tamper with the goods.
As a result, businesses have found that the use of a security seal is no longer an option, but rather a necessity to ensure the items sent are received intact and without compromise.
Keeping cargo secure
Companies should consider:
Cargo security devices include a variety of options. When determining which security seal to use, decision makers must consider:
There are several types of security devices to compare for a load, including:
For use of a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) lane into the United States and/or Canada, motor carriers can apply for membership in the following border-crossing security programs:
Membership in either customs initiative requires implementation of minimum-security criteria, including the use of an ISO 17712 high-security cargo seal. Qualifying cable and bolt seals are both acceptable.
A carrier that habitually fails to seal a load with an ISO 17712 security seal may have its C-TPAT privileges suspended if it does not address its security shortfall.
Identifying an ISO 17712 security seal
ISO 17712 high-security seal markings include:
For more information, go to U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Cargo security devices include a variety of options. When determining which security seal to use, decision makers must consider:
There are several types of security devices to compare for a load, including:
For use of a Free and Secure Trade (FAST) lane into the United States and/or Canada, motor carriers can apply for membership in the following border-crossing security programs:
Membership in either customs initiative requires implementation of minimum-security criteria, including the use of an ISO 17712 high-security cargo seal. Qualifying cable and bolt seals are both acceptable.
A carrier that habitually fails to seal a load with an ISO 17712 security seal may have its C-TPAT privileges suspended if it does not address its security shortfall.
Identifying an ISO 17712 security seal
ISO 17712 high-security seal markings include:
For more information, go to U.S. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.
Companies should vet drivers to verify that the person applying to transport shipments is not a security threat to themselves or the community. A responsible vetting process will include:
Employers should document the vetting process for hiring managers. Outline the steps of the process. Show examples of what to do or ask before and after an applicant is interviewed. While completing the process for each driver may seem tedious, it can save valuable time, money and frustration while keeping the company, employees, and community safe.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also to Driver Qualification and Drug and Alcohol Testing.
Perhaps the most critical step for employers in the initial driver screening process is a thorough review and verification of the written application. Responsible employers need to verify that all information on the submitted driver application is accurate and complete.
In addition to the requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSR), driver applications should ask for very specific information such as:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also to Driver Qualification and Drug and Alcohol Testing.
The following tips are provided to help carriers know what to look for — and look out for— when reviewing written application forms.
Look for:
Look out for:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
Another important information-gathering tool for employers is the in-person driver interview. Even if a motor carrier lacks the resources to conduct comprehensive background investigations on each driver applicant, all organizations possess the internal capabilities to hold personal, face-to-face interviews with each prospective driver.
In today’s environment where everyone must operate with a heightened sense of caution and alertness, the process of hiring drivers, and even non-driving employees, has become critically important to any organization’s safety and security effort.
The problem experienced at many carriers, however, is that many, if not most, driver recruiters, supervisors, and managers have received no formal or specific training on how to conduct a thorough and in-depth driver interview.
Due to the incredibly high level of driver turnover experienced in several segments of the motor carrier industry, many organizations are more concerned with keeping equipment rolling and generating revenue, than about the backgrounds of the drivers hired.
Because of the safety and security risks involved, carriers can no longer afford to be negligent when hiring.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
When interviewing an applicant, recruiters and other carrier officials should be trained to assess the candidate’s answers not only for what is revealed, but also for what is not revealed. Vague or incomplete answers to specific and detailed questions may be indicators of the applicant trying to hide information and should raise concerns (red flags).
Interviewers should fill in all gaps and dig for complete information. Applicants should be expected to provide satisfactory answers to the following red flags:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
In addition to serving as an information-gathering tool, if done improperly, the in-person driver interview can quickly become a corporate liability.
Asking questions prohibited by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during any pre-employment interview may open the door for an applicant to take legal action against the company. However, in the current safety- and security-conscious environment, motor carriers need to gather as much applicable information on a driver candidate as possible.
Lawful questions
How can carriers stay within the law while obtaining critical background information on each applicant during the in-person interview? One way is to be consistent by asking each applicant the same questions for a particular position.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
One of the most critical elements of a successful safety and security program is the pre-employment screening process. Unfortunately, the importance of this relatively straightforward task is often overlooked.
Pre-employment investigations
Motor carriers can either do background investigations on applicants, or can hire a third-party provider. Background investigations may include a review of the applicant’s:
But regardless of who completes the background investigation, the important point is that a thorough, accurate, and verified background investigation is done on each driver candidate before a hiring decision is made.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also Driver Qualifications
With respect to the regulations, investigation and inquiries into a driver’s background are designed mainly to verify the driver’s driving experience and the accuracy of the information the prospective driver provided on the application.
The regulations provide a starting point for investigating the background of prospective drivers.
Section 391.23 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) states that each motor carrier shall make the following investigations and inquiries with respect to each driver it employs:
The regulation requires previous Department of Transportation (DOT) employers to produce the requested safety performance history information.
However, any previous employers not regulated by the DOT are not obligated to respond to any inquiry.
Accepting a previous employer’s refusal or unwillingness to share information may not be an option. The potential security risks of a company not knowing exactly who it’s hiring are too high. Motor carriers need to verify all background information from prospective drivers every time.
The following tips are provided to help employers obtain the necessary previous employer information:
Warnings
Don’t just verify work history. Look for signs that the driver left previous employers under less than amiable terms.
For example, if the driver is applying for a position that pays less than a previous job, this could be a red flag that requires deeper investigation. It is highly unusual for a driver to take a significant cut in pay and benefits when switching employers.
Was the driver forced to leave because of a drug or theft incident? It’s the prospective employer’s job to find out.
Conducting a thorough and consistent investigation into the employment background of every new driver should produce the timeline and work experience information motor carriers need to make responsible and safe hiring decisions.
A final note on reference checking — expect it to be a frustrating and time-consuming process. Because of the transient nature of the motor carrier industry — characterized by high driver turnover — it is not unusual for a driver candidate to have numerous previous employers listed on the application.
But regardless of how many previous employers a prospective driver has had, if employers intend to go on with the qualification process, each one must be contacted.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
Perhaps the most critical step for employers in the initial driver screening process is a thorough review and verification of the written application. Responsible employers need to verify that all information on the submitted driver application is accurate and complete.
In addition to the requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSR), driver applications should ask for very specific information such as:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also to Driver Qualification and Drug and Alcohol Testing.
The following tips are provided to help carriers know what to look for — and look out for— when reviewing written application forms.
Look for:
Look out for:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
The following tips are provided to help carriers know what to look for — and look out for— when reviewing written application forms.
Look for:
Look out for:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
Another important information-gathering tool for employers is the in-person driver interview. Even if a motor carrier lacks the resources to conduct comprehensive background investigations on each driver applicant, all organizations possess the internal capabilities to hold personal, face-to-face interviews with each prospective driver.
In today’s environment where everyone must operate with a heightened sense of caution and alertness, the process of hiring drivers, and even non-driving employees, has become critically important to any organization’s safety and security effort.
The problem experienced at many carriers, however, is that many, if not most, driver recruiters, supervisors, and managers have received no formal or specific training on how to conduct a thorough and in-depth driver interview.
Due to the incredibly high level of driver turnover experienced in several segments of the motor carrier industry, many organizations are more concerned with keeping equipment rolling and generating revenue, than about the backgrounds of the drivers hired.
Because of the safety and security risks involved, carriers can no longer afford to be negligent when hiring.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
When interviewing an applicant, recruiters and other carrier officials should be trained to assess the candidate’s answers not only for what is revealed, but also for what is not revealed. Vague or incomplete answers to specific and detailed questions may be indicators of the applicant trying to hide information and should raise concerns (red flags).
Interviewers should fill in all gaps and dig for complete information. Applicants should be expected to provide satisfactory answers to the following red flags:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
In addition to serving as an information-gathering tool, if done improperly, the in-person driver interview can quickly become a corporate liability.
Asking questions prohibited by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during any pre-employment interview may open the door for an applicant to take legal action against the company. However, in the current safety- and security-conscious environment, motor carriers need to gather as much applicable information on a driver candidate as possible.
Lawful questions
How can carriers stay within the law while obtaining critical background information on each applicant during the in-person interview? One way is to be consistent by asking each applicant the same questions for a particular position.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
When interviewing an applicant, recruiters and other carrier officials should be trained to assess the candidate’s answers not only for what is revealed, but also for what is not revealed. Vague or incomplete answers to specific and detailed questions may be indicators of the applicant trying to hide information and should raise concerns (red flags).
Interviewers should fill in all gaps and dig for complete information. Applicants should be expected to provide satisfactory answers to the following red flags:
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
In addition to serving as an information-gathering tool, if done improperly, the in-person driver interview can quickly become a corporate liability.
Asking questions prohibited by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during any pre-employment interview may open the door for an applicant to take legal action against the company. However, in the current safety- and security-conscious environment, motor carriers need to gather as much applicable information on a driver candidate as possible.
Lawful questions
How can carriers stay within the law while obtaining critical background information on each applicant during the in-person interview? One way is to be consistent by asking each applicant the same questions for a particular position.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
One of the most critical elements of a successful safety and security program is the pre-employment screening process. Unfortunately, the importance of this relatively straightforward task is often overlooked.
Pre-employment investigations
Motor carriers can either do background investigations on applicants, or can hire a third-party provider. Background investigations may include a review of the applicant’s:
But regardless of who completes the background investigation, the important point is that a thorough, accurate, and verified background investigation is done on each driver candidate before a hiring decision is made.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also Driver Qualifications
With respect to the regulations, investigation and inquiries into a driver’s background are designed mainly to verify the driver’s driving experience and the accuracy of the information the prospective driver provided on the application.
The regulations provide a starting point for investigating the background of prospective drivers.
Section 391.23 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) states that each motor carrier shall make the following investigations and inquiries with respect to each driver it employs:
The regulation requires previous Department of Transportation (DOT) employers to produce the requested safety performance history information.
However, any previous employers not regulated by the DOT are not obligated to respond to any inquiry.
Accepting a previous employer’s refusal or unwillingness to share information may not be an option. The potential security risks of a company not knowing exactly who it’s hiring are too high. Motor carriers need to verify all background information from prospective drivers every time.
The following tips are provided to help employers obtain the necessary previous employer information:
Warnings
Don’t just verify work history. Look for signs that the driver left previous employers under less than amiable terms.
For example, if the driver is applying for a position that pays less than a previous job, this could be a red flag that requires deeper investigation. It is highly unusual for a driver to take a significant cut in pay and benefits when switching employers.
Was the driver forced to leave because of a drug or theft incident? It’s the prospective employer’s job to find out.
Conducting a thorough and consistent investigation into the employment background of every new driver should produce the timeline and work experience information motor carriers need to make responsible and safe hiring decisions.
A final note on reference checking — expect it to be a frustrating and time-consuming process. Because of the transient nature of the motor carrier industry — characterized by high driver turnover — it is not unusual for a driver candidate to have numerous previous employers listed on the application.
But regardless of how many previous employers a prospective driver has had, if employers intend to go on with the qualification process, each one must be contacted.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
See also Driver Qualifications
With respect to the regulations, investigation and inquiries into a driver’s background are designed mainly to verify the driver’s driving experience and the accuracy of the information the prospective driver provided on the application.
The regulations provide a starting point for investigating the background of prospective drivers.
Section 391.23 of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) states that each motor carrier shall make the following investigations and inquiries with respect to each driver it employs:
The regulation requires previous Department of Transportation (DOT) employers to produce the requested safety performance history information.
However, any previous employers not regulated by the DOT are not obligated to respond to any inquiry.
Accepting a previous employer’s refusal or unwillingness to share information may not be an option. The potential security risks of a company not knowing exactly who it’s hiring are too high. Motor carriers need to verify all background information from prospective drivers every time.
The following tips are provided to help employers obtain the necessary previous employer information:
Warnings
Don’t just verify work history. Look for signs that the driver left previous employers under less than amiable terms.
For example, if the driver is applying for a position that pays less than a previous job, this could be a red flag that requires deeper investigation. It is highly unusual for a driver to take a significant cut in pay and benefits when switching employers.
Was the driver forced to leave because of a drug or theft incident? It’s the prospective employer’s job to find out.
Conducting a thorough and consistent investigation into the employment background of every new driver should produce the timeline and work experience information motor carriers need to make responsible and safe hiring decisions.
A final note on reference checking — expect it to be a frustrating and time-consuming process. Because of the transient nature of the motor carrier industry — characterized by high driver turnover — it is not unusual for a driver candidate to have numerous previous employers listed on the application.
But regardless of how many previous employers a prospective driver has had, if employers intend to go on with the qualification process, each one must be contacted.
HR topics to review as you hire motor carrier employees: Americans with Disabilities Act and Discrimination.
Safeguarding a shipment begins before the driver and truck even reach the shipper. Security practices include:
Until the load reaches the receiver, and its integrity is verified, the driver and motor carrier must ensure the supply chain is secured.
Driver supervision at the shipper during the loading process is important from a purely cargo claims prevention perspective. Drivers and motor carriers need to make sure that the right quantity of the right product is put on the trailer. In addition, drivers need to ensure cargo that shows any sign of damage or leakage is not loaded.
In almost all cases, once the cargo is signed for, it becomes the carrier’s responsibility.
Unauthorized cargo
Drivers must ensure there isn’t any unauthorized or unscheduled box, carton, package, or other cargo (regardless of size) being loaded on or in trailers.
Company policies and procedures should state:
Loading practices
Whenever possible, drivers should be instructed to load the most valuable cargo in the nose of the trailer and as far away from the doors as possible. In this way, unless the target is the entire trailer, criminals will have a much more difficult time getting to the most coveted (valuable) freight.
Reviewing shipping papers
All load-related documentation should be thoroughly reviewed and verified by the driver. Drivers must confirm that the right amount of the right product(s) was in fact loaded on the trailer. Any discrepancies need to be reported and resolved before the paperwork is signed or the trailer is sealed. Only after the driver is satisfied that everything is in order, should the bill of lading be signed and the trailer sealed.
Sealing the load
When putting a security seal of any type on a trailer, drivers should have a shipper representative present as a witness.
A suggested method of sealing the shipment involves the acronym VVTT. This same process should also be practiced after any stops along the way:
Shipper load-and-count trailers
A driver should verify the integrity of a security seal that the shipper put on a loaded trailer prior to the driver arriving.
The driver should ensure:
The following driver actions while on the road can help reduce the likelihood of cargo theft or tampering and personal injury.
When leaving the shipper
Employers should train drivers to be especially alert when leaving a shipper. Criminals have been known to wait outside of distribution centers to follow trucks until the vehicle stops. Tell drivers to be aware near signal-regulated highway on- and off-ramps. These are prime vehicle hijack areas.
When leaving a shipper, drivers should:
Driver check-ins
Companies can use regular driver check-ins help keep the motor carrier informed and up to date. A daily check-in with supervisors while out on the road can serve as an early warning system if a driver fails to make normal contact.
Refrain from discussing load-related information
Information — such as load content, pick-up and delivery schedules, and routing — should never be discussed with anyone while out on the road. Train employees accordingly.
Stop and park safely and securely
Train drivers to only stop when needed at reputable truck stops or high-traffic rest areas.
Best practices include:
Be suspicious of anyone asking the driver to stop
A frequent ploy used by hijackers is to create a scenario that forces or compels the driver to stop.
Drivers who become a victim of hijacking should:
Inspect the vehicle
The equipment should be inspected after each stop or rest period. In addition to conducting a normal inspection of safety-related items, drivers should also check security seals and look for anything unusual or suspicious on the vehicle.
When drivers arrive at a destination, the process of unloading is fairly straightforward. After all, the hardest and most dangerous part of the trip is over. The driver has arrived safely, and the cargo remained secure and intact.
Employers should train drivers to understand that the two main unloading activities a driver should be involved with include:
Recheck trailer and cargo integrity
Load security ends with the driver and responsible receiving personnel working together to unload the trailer.
Unloading procedures are as follows. The driver and receiver:
Supervise and complete unloading activities
During the unloading process, the driver should report any discrepancies or damage to the motor carrier as soon as possible.
Driver supervision of the unloading process is recommended mainly for cargo claims protection for the carrier.
Driver supervision at the shipper during the loading process is important from a purely cargo claims prevention perspective. Drivers and motor carriers need to make sure that the right quantity of the right product is put on the trailer. In addition, drivers need to ensure cargo that shows any sign of damage or leakage is not loaded.
In almost all cases, once the cargo is signed for, it becomes the carrier’s responsibility.
Unauthorized cargo
Drivers must ensure there isn’t any unauthorized or unscheduled box, carton, package, or other cargo (regardless of size) being loaded on or in trailers.
Company policies and procedures should state:
Loading practices
Whenever possible, drivers should be instructed to load the most valuable cargo in the nose of the trailer and as far away from the doors as possible. In this way, unless the target is the entire trailer, criminals will have a much more difficult time getting to the most coveted (valuable) freight.
Reviewing shipping papers
All load-related documentation should be thoroughly reviewed and verified by the driver. Drivers must confirm that the right amount of the right product(s) was in fact loaded on the trailer. Any discrepancies need to be reported and resolved before the paperwork is signed or the trailer is sealed. Only after the driver is satisfied that everything is in order, should the bill of lading be signed and the trailer sealed.
Sealing the load
When putting a security seal of any type on a trailer, drivers should have a shipper representative present as a witness.
A suggested method of sealing the shipment involves the acronym VVTT. This same process should also be practiced after any stops along the way:
Shipper load-and-count trailers
A driver should verify the integrity of a security seal that the shipper put on a loaded trailer prior to the driver arriving.
The driver should ensure:
The following driver actions while on the road can help reduce the likelihood of cargo theft or tampering and personal injury.
When leaving the shipper
Employers should train drivers to be especially alert when leaving a shipper. Criminals have been known to wait outside of distribution centers to follow trucks until the vehicle stops. Tell drivers to be aware near signal-regulated highway on- and off-ramps. These are prime vehicle hijack areas.
When leaving a shipper, drivers should:
Driver check-ins
Companies can use regular driver check-ins help keep the motor carrier informed and up to date. A daily check-in with supervisors while out on the road can serve as an early warning system if a driver fails to make normal contact.
Refrain from discussing load-related information
Information — such as load content, pick-up and delivery schedules, and routing — should never be discussed with anyone while out on the road. Train employees accordingly.
Stop and park safely and securely
Train drivers to only stop when needed at reputable truck stops or high-traffic rest areas.
Best practices include:
Be suspicious of anyone asking the driver to stop
A frequent ploy used by hijackers is to create a scenario that forces or compels the driver to stop.
Drivers who become a victim of hijacking should:
Inspect the vehicle
The equipment should be inspected after each stop or rest period. In addition to conducting a normal inspection of safety-related items, drivers should also check security seals and look for anything unusual or suspicious on the vehicle.